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Abstract 
This thesis consists of a brief introduction, which situates the work within in the 
intellectual history of development theory, and three papers that address 
important gaps in our understanding about the dynamics of urbanisation and 
urban development in sub-Saharan Africa.  
    The first provides an interdisciplinary, historical perspective on the dynamics 
of urbanisation and urban growth in the region from the colonial era to the 
present day. I argue that these processes are fundamentally driven by mortality 
decline set in motion by improvements in disease control and food security. 
Viewed through this lens, the widely noted phenomena of ‘urbanisation 
without growth’ and very rapid urban population growth in the late 20th 
century are not as unusual as they have often been portrayed by development 
economists and policymakers. 
    The second addresses the question of why sub-Saharan Africa has the highest 
rate of slum incidence of any major world region. I argue that slums can be 
interpreted as a consequence of ‘disjointed modernization’ in which urban 
population growth outpaces economic and institutional development. I trace the 
origins of disjointed modernization in sub-Saharan Africa back to the colonial 
period and show that colonial era investments and institutions are reflected in 
contemporary variation in slum incidence. I argue that ‘status quo interests’ and 
the rise of an anti-urbanisation bias in development discourse have inhibited 
investment and reform in the post-colonial era. 
    The final paper presents and tests an empirical model designed to account for 
variation in urban protest activity across countries in the region. The model is 
comprised of basic demographic, political and economic factors that 
theoretically influence the motives, means and opportunities of potential 
protestors. The results of a panel data analysis are consistent with the core 
hypotheses, but several unexpected results emerge. More research is required to 
confirm these results, clarify mechanisms and account for broader trends in 
contentious collective action in the region. 
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Chapter One  
 
Urbanisation and African development: a research agenda 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this introductory chapter I situate the thesis within the intellectual 
history of development theory, outline the empirical questions 
addressed in the following chapters and offer a preview of the 
findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Urbanisation and development theory: a brief intellectual history 
Historians and social scientists have traditionally associated the ‘Urban 
Revolution’—i.e. the emergence of cities and urban ways of living some 6000 
years ago—with the rise of civilization, with progress, and with modernity. 
Early cities were incubators of the socio-political institutions and technologies 
that made the rise of history’s great civilizations possible (Childe 1950; Sjoberg 
1960; Mumford 1961; Davis 1965; Pye 1969), and for thousands of years towns 
and cities served as the nerve centres of gradually expanding political 
communities and economic networks (Braudel 1984; Bairoch 1988; Abu-Lughod 
10 
 
1991). However, despite the political and economic power of these early urban 
centres, their populations remained relatively small until the 18th century. As 
the Industrial Revolution gathered pace in Northern Europe, cities began to 
swell rapidly, first in Europe and then in other regions of the globe. As a result, 
the European experience of urbanisation has generally served as the empirical 
starting point for social scientists seeking to understand the process and its 
relationship to social change elsewhere.  
    In surveying the processes and events that contributed to the rise of 
capitalism and the Industrial Revolution in Europe, early economists 
recognized the contribution of towns and cities: large, dense, heterogeneous 
settlements generate economies of scale and external economies, encourage the 
division of labour in society, and stimulate technological innovation and the 
diffusion of knowledge (Smith 1991[1776]; Marshall 1920). Similarly, the 
pioneers of sociology, such as Tönnies, Weber, Durkheim and Wirth examined 
the ways in which urban living transforms social organisation, social values, 
and the role of the individual in community and society. With the emergence of 
development studies in the aftermath of World War II, the theoretical and 
empirical contributions of these early social scientists served as the foundation 
for modernization theory—the first major theoretical paradigm in the field.  
    Modernization theorists portrayed development as a process of socio-
economic evolution that follows a more or less similar path as societies 
transition from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ ways of living. This theoretical 
approach drew heavily on the histories of capitalist nations in the West, the 
alternative model of economic development implied by the rise of the Soviet 
Union, and the experience of rapid reconstruction of European nations after 
WWII. While the concept remained loosely and variously defined over the 
years, modernization was effectively synonymous with industrialisation and 
secularisation, and industrialisation and secularisation were, in turn, closely 
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associated with the process of urbanisation (UN 1968; Reissman 1970; Germani 
1973; Irwin 1975; Ranis 2004).  
    Urbanisation was understood to be a natural by-product and facilitator of 
industrial development, driven by the growth of employment opportunities in 
urban areas as a result of industrial investment during the ‘take-off’ stage of 
economic development (Rostow 1960). A steady flow of migrants in search of 
work in the ‘modern sector’ was expected to keep real wages low, thereby 
enhancing the profits of industrial enterprises and the quantity of surplus 
capital available for further growth-enhancing investments (Lewis 1954). By 
shifting people out of subsistence agricultural production and into higher 
value-added activities that entail increasing specialisation and exchange, the 
process of urbanisation was seen as contributing to the economic 
transformation of societies.  
    Urban living was also seen as a stimulus for the cultivation of social attitudes, 
beliefs, and values conducive to capitalist development, as well as a force for 
political consolidation and the development of nationalism (Gerschenkron 1963; 
Huntington 1968; Pye 1969; Reissman 1970; Boone 2012). In urban areas social 
relations based on kinship, clan and tribe are augmented and replaced by those 
based on occupation, income, location of residence and forms of recreation. 
Social mobility, both horizontal and vertical, is greater in cities due to the 
diversity of economic activities and the possibility to obtain regular waged 
employment (Bairoch 1988). And urbanism has long been associated with 
reduced fertility rates, which results in slower population growth and enhanced 
freedom for women as they gain more control over their reproductive cycle 
(Notestein 1945, cited in Dyson 2001, 73).  
    In sum, the prevailing attitude of early development theorists was that the 
process of urbanisation is a positive phenomenon and that ‘urban life is the 
dynamic basis for most of the activities and processes we associate with 
modernity and economic progress’ (Pye 1969, 401). Significantly, modernization 
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theory served as a guide for those engaged in development as an activity—as a 
‘conscious collective enterprise’ (Brett 2009)—such as the development planners 
trained in North America, Europe and the Soviet Union who were deployed by 
the newly established bilateral aid agencies and multilateral institutions set up 
in the post-war period. And the theory evolved in an intellectual climate that 
accepted the potentially constructive role of an activist state pursuing 
modernity through accelerated investment programmes and strategic planning 
(Ranis 2004).  
    Consequently, urban and regional planning initiatives were pillars of early 
development efforts. Urban planning and investment was seen as essential to 
create the physical and institutional platforms required for the successful 
implementation of import-substitution-driven industrial development, and 
regional planning was seen as a tool for nation-building by promoting the 
integration of the economic, political and social lives of diverse communities 
within a given national territory (Friedmann 1967; UN 1968). There was a very 
clear and conscious effort to direct the process of urbanisation, which generally 
manifested in policies explicitly designed to mimic the forms of cities and urban 
systems in Europe and North America in an attempt to invoke or accelerate 
modernization through spatial planning.  
    These efforts were also informed by immediate concerns about the emerging 
patterns and consequences of rapid urban population growth in less-developed 
regions. A series of UN-sponsored surveys in Africa, Asia and Latin America in 
the 1950s revealed historically unprecedented rates of urban population 
growth, burgeoning shanty towns and rising under- and un-employment, 
particularly among youth (UN 1968, 3-4). These trends raised fears of social and 
political instability in these regions and stimulated calls for more resources to 
be channelled towards understanding and managing urbanisation. But a sea-
change in development discourse and practice in the 1970s resulted in a retreat 
from urban-centred development strategies. Indeed, there was a growing 
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sentiment that urban and regional planning was not only ineffective, but quite 
possibly harmful.  
 
This shift was long in the making and resulted from the convergence of 
multiple critiques of prevailing development discourses and policies. First, 
there was a growing sense that the resources and capacities of local and 
national governments in developing countries were simply inadequate to 
effectively absorb rapidly expanding urban populations, and that attempts to 
do so resulted in an inefficient allocation of scarce resources. Already in the 
1950s the term ‘over-urbanization’ was coined to describe the apparent 
imbalance between rates of urban population growth and industrial 
development—a situation that was portrayed as ‘abnormal’ in comparison to 
the European experience (Sovani 1964). In a very influential article, 
development economists Harris and Todaro (1970) recommended shifting 
resources away from urban development and putting in place policies to 
discourage or prevent rural-urban migration, and such policies were 
subsequently implemented in countries across the world (see Chapter 3). 
    Second, there was a growing consensus that the strategy of state-driven 
industrialisation was not working and possibly undermining development 
objectives. The anticipated (positive) ‘spread’ effects of industrial investment in 
urban centres increasingly appeared to be outweighed by the (negative) 
‘backwash’ effects (Myrdal 1963), and there was concern that in response to 
demographic pressure in urban areas public expenditure was skewed towards 
providing services in rapidly growing cities to prevent unrest at the expense of 
growth-enhancing investments in rural areas (Pye 1969; Sovani 1964). Instead of 
contributing to industrial transformation, rapid urban growth was seen to be 
creating a situation in which ‘urban misery and rural poverty exist side by side,’ 
leading to the pessimistic conclusion that ‘the city [in developing regions] can 
hardly be called “dynamic,” as social historians of developed countries 
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generally described the process of urbanization’ (UN/UNESCO 1957, cited in 
Sovani 1964, 113). Such negative assessments were further strengthened by 
economic crises across the developing world in the 1970s and 1980s, which 
revealed the unsustainable nature of many of the industrialisation strategies in 
place. 
    Third, the gross inequalities that had emerged between wealthy political-
business elites on the one hand and the masses of peasants and urban poor on 
the other as a result of these strategies became increasingly clear, stoking an 
already growing interest in distributional issues among development scholars 
and professionals, particularly at the World Bank (Seers 1969; Chenery et al 
1974; Fei, Ranis and Kuo 1979). These concerns were echoed in more radical 
form by dependency theorists, such as Frank (1967) and Cardoso (1972), who 
offered a scathing critique of modernization theory. These scholars claimed that 
wealthy nations achieved their economic success on the back of less-developed 
countries; that poor nations were actively underdeveloped by the globalisation of 
capitalism; and that the discourse of development was merely a façade 
concealing the interests of powerful nations and international capitalists. From 
the dependency perspective, cities were depicted as parasitic ‘islands of 
privilege’ and outposts of capitalist penetration inhabited by a comprador class 
systematically exploiting the rural masses (Schatzberg 1979; Southall 1979).  
    As the desirability, effectiveness and fairness of urban-centred development 
strategies came under question, mainstream development discourse shifted 
emphasis away from industrialisation and toward growth and poverty 
alleviation. Given the wide income and welfare gaps apparent between rural 
and urban areas (when drawing on statistics aggregated at the city-level), and 
given that the majority of the world’s poor live in rural areas, the new emphasis 
on poverty alleviation was naturally accompanied by a surge of interest in rural 
(as opposed to urban) development. At the extreme, urban development was 
portrayed as the primary source of inequality and an obstacle to national 
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development. In the most concise and forceful summary of this position, 
Michael Lipton advanced  what became known as the ‘urban bias thesis’, which 
essentially portrayed economic development as a zero-sum game between rural 
and urban areas: 
 
The most important class conflict in the poor countries of the world 
today is not between labour and capital. Nor is it between foreign and 
national interests. It is between the rural classes and the urban classes. 
The rural sector contains most of the poverty, and most of the low-cost 
sources of potential advance; but the urban sector contains most of the 
articulateness, organization and power. So the urban classes have been 
able to ‘win’ most of the rounds of the struggle with the countryside; but 
in so doing they have made the development process needlessly slow 
and unfair (1977, 1). 
 
Further research appeared to support his claims (Bates 1981; Agarwala 1983), 
lending momentum to the anti-urban turn in mainstream development research 
and policy. This was bolstered by the rise of a neoliberal orthodoxy (i.e. 
Washington Consensus) that portrayed state intervention in the economy as a 
disruptive and counterproductive force. In a push to ‘roll back the state’, urban 
and regional planning was side-lined and the process of urbanisation more 
generally was increasingly portrayed ‘as a vicious trend in human society’ 
(Lowry 1990; see also Arnott and Gersovitz 1986; Massey 1996). In the course of 
one generation the initially positive view of the relationship between 
urbanisation and development held by scholars and professionals had turned 
decidedly negative. 
    This is not to say that there was a ‘pro-urbanisation’ bias in development 
theory or policy prior to the 1970s. Colonial powers in Africa and elsewhere put 
policies in place to restrict rural-urban migration and settlement in urban areas. 
In the postcolonial era some national governments such as China, Cambodia, 
South Africa and Tanzania implemented forced rural settlement as an explicit 
development policy. Nevertheless, mainstream development theory and policy 
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generally viewed urbanisation as a natural complement to economic 
development and ‘modernization’ until the emergence of this theoretical 
paradigm that portrayed cities and urban population growth as an important 
obstacle to economic development. 
    Due to this shift in mainstream development discourse, the study of 
urbanisation has remained peripheral in the field of development studies over 
the past few decades resulting in a dearth of research (Beall and Fox 2009). This 
research deficit is problematic from a policy perspective. As Lucian Pye 
observed over four decades ago, ‘it is peculiarly difficult to achieve sound and 
enlightened [urban development] policies because there is so little accurate 
information and knowledge about…the dynamics of the urbanization process’ 
(Pye 1969, 401). This observation remains relevant today, particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 
1.2 Addressing some big, basic questions about Africa’s urban transition 
In 1968, a report published by the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (UNECA) offered the following warning: 
 
For Africa, [the] unprecedented increase of the urban population in the 
recent past, and the prospects for further increase in the near future, 
have immediate economic and social implications concerning 
employment, housing, education, health, etc; unless positive planning 
measures are taken, this rapid growth of urban population in Africa is 
likely to aggravate the present urban pathology, expand the 
“bidonvilles,” slums and shantytowns, and lead to considerable 
discontent and unrest (UNECA 1969, 128). 
 
In many respects these fears have been realised. Africa’s urban population 
continued to grow rapidly in the decades to follow, and this growth was 
accompanied by the proliferation of unplanned settlements characterised by 
very poor living conditions. In 2010 UN-Habitat estimated that over 150 million 
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Africans were living in ‘slum’ conditions, representing roughly 60% of the 
urban population of the region—by far the highest rate of ‘slum incidence’ of 
any major world region. Demonstrations, riots and strikes are a regular feature 
of urban life in many countries across the region, and there is some evidence 
that episodes of urban unrest may be increasing in frequency. There is now a 
growing sense that an ‘urban crisis’ is brewing in sub-Saharan Africa (Tibaijuka 
2007; Hove, Ngwerume and Muchemwa 2013). Exactly 40 years after sounding 
the alarm, the UNECA made the following observation: 
 
the huge infrastructure challenge of the rising urban population is yet to 
receive the attention that it deserves. In the final analysis, Africa’s future 
also depends [alongside rural development] on how effectively its 
growing cities are leveraged for economic growth and development 
(UNECA 2008, 109). 
 
There is, however, no consensus on how to harness urbanisation and ‘leverage’ 
African cities to achieve development objectives. This is due, at least in part, to 
the lack of systematic comparative research on the dynamics of urbanisation 
and development over the past several decades, especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa. It is this knowledge deficit that serves as the primary motivation for this 
collection of papers, which addresses three big, basic questions that have 
received surprisingly little attention from development scholars in recent 
decades: 
 
1) What is driving urbanisation and urban growth in sub-Saharan Africa? 
2) Why does sub-Saharan Africa have the highest rate of slum incidence of 
any major world region, and what accounts for the wide variation in 
slum incidence across countries within the region? 
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3) Why are some countries more prone to urban protest (i.e. 
demonstrations, riots and strikes) than others, and what accounts for 
variation in protest activity within countries over time? 
 
My approach to answering these questions combines the sensibility of historical 
comparative research (HCR) with the kind of cross-country statistical analysis 
of observational data that is commonplace in contemporary development 
economics.  
    Generally speaking, historical comparative researchers use the systematic 
comparison of a relatively small number of cases to develop causal arguments 
about phenomena of interest that may be applied to a larger universe of cases. 
As a social research methodology it is primarily inductive in nature, seeking 
insights to inform theory and generate new hypotheses rather than to test 
existing ones (Gerring 2007; Mahoney and Rueschmeyer 2003; Steinmo 2001; 
Thelen 1999; Tilly 1984). It is also an approach that assumes ‘that the time and 
place in which a structure or process appears makes a difference to its 
character’ and that the sequencing of events matters to outcomes of interest 
(Tilly 1984, 79). Historically-minded researchers deal ‘in a multiplicity of 
causes’, attentive to the interactions between multiple processes and 
‘intervening variables’ on a single outcome, and seek to provide some narrative 
order to this complexity by identifying hierarchies of causation to highlight the 
most important mechanisms driving particular outcomes based on logical 
reasoning (Carr 1990; Mahoney 2003; Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu 2009). 
        These characteristics of historical comparative research—i.e. the focus on 
induction, attention to the location, timing and sequencing of events, and 
recognition of multiple causal pathways—make it uniquely suitable for the 
investigation of ‘”big” questions of structures and processes’ such as 
urbanisation that remain poorly understood (Mahoney and Rueschmeyer 2003; 
see also Tilly 1984). The chapters to follow are heavily informed by this 
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approach: each explicitly seeks to construct a contextually-informed causal 
narrative based on process tracing using the best evidence available. 
    Unlike traditional HCR, I mostly test my hypotheses using statistical analyses 
of large samples rather than carefully constructed case comparisons.1 This 
aspect of my research is very much inspired by the cross-country studies that 
have been published in what might be called the ‘history matters’ movement in 
development economics, which can be traced back to the late 1990s with the 
proliferation of research into the long-run economic consequences of factor 
endowments, colonialism and legal institutions (see Nunn 2009 for an excellent 
survey of this research). Moving beyond the politically naïve macroeconomic 
development models of the past, as well as the seemingly inexhaustible state 
versus market debate, scholars such as Englebert (2000), Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2001), Lange (2004), and Nunn (2008) demonstrated the 
profound and lasting impact of past events such as colonial occupation and 
slavery on subsequent development trajectories using creative statistical 
analyses. At roughly the same time scholars such as Gallup, Sachs and 
Mellinger (1999) and Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) found significant evidence 
of the long-run development implications of geographic and ecological 
endowments. One of the great strengths of these studies was their ability to 
explicitly test the generalizability of theories that, in many cases, had originally 
been advanced by qualitative researchers.  
    Combining the inductive, narrative emphasis of historical comparative 
research with the generalizability of statistical analysis allowed me to develop 
and test theories designed to account for the stylised facts of Africa’s urban 
transition. However, what is gained in breadth is lost in depth. The quantity 
and quality of African data is poor, particularly in urban areas, forcing me to 
employ relatively crude models with rough proxies for actual variables of 
                                                          
1 In should be noted, however, that many of the theories and hypotheses tested in these 
chapters were informed or inspired by the careful interrogation of small numbers of cases. 
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interest. Moreover, quantitative analysis based on observational data of macro 
processes is not well-suited to the task of testing specific causal mechanisms, 
particularly when political factors take centre stage in the narrative. In many 
cases, more fine-grained qualitative research will be needed to confirm and 
support my claims. Nevertheless, I am confident in the integrity of the 
arguments presented in the pages to follow. 
 
1.3 Preview of the findings 
Chapter Two draws on insights from development economics, demographic 
theory and economic history to account for the stylised facts of sub-Saharan 
Africa’s urban transition, namely a late onset relative to other major world 
regions, very rapid urban population growth and persistent urbanisation in the 
face of economic crisis and stagnation, a phenomenon dubbed ‘urbanisation 
without growth’. These latter two dynamics have been a source of considerable 
concern for decades. Portrayed as abnormal and undesirable, they have 
motivated the adoption of policies designed discourage or prevent rural-urban 
migration. These policies have serially failed to have any discernible effect on 
demographic trends in the region or socioeconomic development. A different 
approach is clearly needed. 
    I argue that urbanisation and urban growth are fundamentally driven by 
mortality decline, which in turn is stimulated by technological and institutional 
changes that facilitate disease control and food security in urban areas. While 
economic development can accelerate the process, it is not a necessary condition 
for urbanisation and rapid urban growth to occur. In Africa, mortality decline 
was set in motion during the colonial era; sustained economic development in 
the form of expansion and diversification of output was not. This explains the 
apparent de-coupling of urbanisation and economic development in the region 
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and highlights the need for concerned policymakers to focus less on population 
mobility and more on mortality and fertility trends. 
    In Chapter Three I address the question of why so many Africans live in 
slums, and why there is such dramatic variation in ‘slum incidence’ across the 
region. In a major 2003 report UN-Habitat cited a wide range of factors that 
have been identified by researchers as contributing to the prevalence of slums 
in developing countries, including rapid urban growth in the face of resource 
and capacity constraints, poverty, inequality, global economic dynamics, 
liberalization policies, legal exclusion, social exclusion and (in particular) a ‘lack 
of genuine political will to address the issue in a fundamentally structured, 
sustainable and large-scale manner’ (UN-Habitat 2003, 5). I make an effort to 
sift through this bewildering array of explanations in order to identify the 
underlying causes of slum growth and persistence. 
    I argue that the growth of slum settlements in sub-Saharan Africa can 
superficially be understood as product of ‘disjointed modernization’ in which 
urban population growth outpaces economic and institutional development 
and demonstrate empirically that urban population growth, proxies for urban 
economic development and a general indicator of institutional quality 
collectively account for about 70% of cross-country variation in slum incidence. 
I then trace the origins of disjointed modernization back to the colonial period, 
when the physical and institutional foundations of the vast majority of African 
cities were laid, and demonstrate that colonial patterns of investment and 
institutional development are reflected in contemporary patterns of urban 
development. To account for this apparent path dependency, I argue that 
domestic ‘status quo interests’ and the emergence of an anti-urbanisation bias in 
international development circles discouraged a proactive approach to urban 
management in the 1980s and 1990s and contributed to the expansion of slum 
settlements in the region. 
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    In Chapter Four I turn my attention to identifying the determinants of 
variation in urban protest incidence across countries in the region. This is a 
topic that has received surprisingly little attention considering the frequency of 
such events. Combining insights from the conflict studies and contentious 
politics literatures I develop an empirical model of protest incidence comprised 
of basic demographic, political and economic factors that theoretically influence 
the means, motives and opportunities for protest mobilization. 
    A test of this model exploiting panel data indicates that urban protest 
incidence is positively associated with urban population size, an indicator 
democracy, electoral events and institutional reforms, and negatively correlated 
with growth in GDP per capita, as expected. However, the analysis also reveals 
some unexpected results: a country’s level of urbanization and degree of press 
freedom are both negatively correlated with protest incidence while GDP per 
capita is positively associated with reported protests. These findings warrant 
further research, as does the possibility that demographic, political and 
economic trends in the region are driving a transformation in the nature of 
contentious political action in the region. 
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Chapter Two   
 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s urban transition in historical perspective 
 
 
 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s urban transition is characterised by three 
stylised facts: relatively late onset, very rapid urban population 
growth from the mid-20th century, and persistent urbanisation in the 
late twentieth century despite economic crisis and stagnation. In this 
chapter I draw together insights from development economics, 
demographic theory and economic history to account for these 
dynamics. I argue that urbanisation and urban growth are ultimately 
driven by mortality decline, which in turn is linked to disease control 
and food security. Viewed through this lens, urban population 
trends in the region are less unusual than they have often been 
portrayed by development economists and policymakers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In 1960, at the dawn of the independence era, sub-Saharan Africa was the least 
urbanised major world region. Over the course of the following decades the 
region’s urban population grew rapidly in absolute terms and persistently in 
relative terms despite protracted economic crisis—a widely noted but 
inadequately explained phenomenon dubbed ‘urbanisation without growth’ by 
development economists (Fay and Opal 2000). In this chapter I draw together 
insights from demographic theory, development economics and economic 
history to account for these three stylized facts of sub-Saharan Africa’s urban 
transition, namely the late onset of African urbanisation vis-à-vis other major 
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world regions, very rapid urban population growth in the postcolonial era, and 
the persistence urbanisation in the late 20th century despite economic stagnation 
(Table 2.1). 
     
Table 2.1 Urban population and economic trends by region 
 1960  1975-2005 
 
Urban 
population 
(%of total) 
 
Urban 
growth rate 
Urbanisation 
rate 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
Sub-Saharan Africa 14.75  4.27 1.53 -0.15 
East Asia & Pacific 22.46  3.29 1.99 2.90 
South Asia 16.73  3.26 1.18 3.03 
Middle East & North Africa 34.98  3.44 0.90 0.97 
Latin America & Caribbean 49.26  2.64 0.80 1.07 
Notes: Calculated based on data from World Bank World Development Indicators Database, accessed 
January, 2014. GDP growth rate estimates based on GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$).  
 
I argue that the paucity of urban centres in pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa can 
be attributed to natural geographic endowments, which a) limited the 
availability of the surplus food supplies required to establish large, permanent 
settlements and b) imposed a heavy disease burden. Historical evidence from 
other regions indicates that food security and disease control are necessary pre-
requisites for the emergence of urban settlements and the growth of urban 
populations. 
     Knowledge, technologies and institutions introduced through colonialism, 
the intensification of trade from the 19th century and international development 
assistance in the late 20th century all contributed to significant improvements in 
both food security and disease control in the region, setting in motion a secular 
decline in mortality rates and a population boom. By the late colonial era towns 
and cities began to grow rapidly, although restrictions on rural-urban migration 
supressed urbanisation until the independence era, which saw the relaxation of 
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migration restrictions and a surge in employment opportunities for Africans in 
the towns and cities that were mostly established under colonial rule. 
    Beginning in the mid-1970s, economic crises swept across the region resulting 
in widespread urban unemployment, state retrenchment and sharp reduction in 
strategic public investments designed to promote structural transformation in 
economic output. Contrary to the expectations of prevailing economic theories 
of the time, which viewed urbanisation as intrinsically linked to urban 
employment opportunities, urban populations continued to expand in countries 
across the region in both absolute and (in all but a handful of important 
exceptions) relative terms.  
    I argue that this period of ‘urbanisation without growth’ can be explained by 
the demographic processes underpinning urbanisation and urban growth. 
While economic development can serve to stimulate rural-urban migration, and 
hence spur urbanisation, mortality decline is in itself sufficient to drive the 
process. While economic development and mortality decline often go together, 
this is not always and automatically the case. Improvements in disease control 
and food security can be made without stimulating an expansion of per capita 
output or diversification in an economy. 
    In sub-Saharan Africa, countries that have experienced more rapid economic 
and demographic growth have urbanised more quickly in the post-war era, but 
the absence of economic growth has not been sufficient to arrest urbanisation 
and urban population growth wherever mortality has continued to fall and 
sufficient food supplies have remained available. A cross-country statistical 
analysis confirms that mortality decline since 1960 is robustly correlated with 
urbanisation and urban growth in sub-Saharan Africa, while the correlation 
between growth in GDP per capita and urbanisation is inconsistent. In sum, the 
dynamics of Africa’s urban transition, which have often been presented as 
somehow abnormal, are explicable when demographic, economic and historical 
30 
 
factors are integrated into a holistic understanding of the processes of 
urbanisation and urban population growth.  
    The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The following section 
provides key definitions, addresses measurement issues in urban demographic 
research and summarises key data deficits. Section three reviews theories of 
urbanisation in development economics, demography and economic history 
and presents an integrated framework for analysing the forces that drive the 
process. Section four applies this framework to urbanisation trends in Africa in 
the pre-colonial and colonial era and provides some statistical evidence that 
natural geographic endowments and variations in colonial experience have had 
long lasting effects on country-level trajectories of urbanisation and urban 
growth. Section five examines the dynamics of African urbanisation in the post-
colonial era and provides an empirical analysis which supports the argument 
that ‘urbanisation without growth’ may be accounted for once unique historical 
circumstances and population dynamics are factored into the analysis. Section 
six concludes with a comment on the policy implications of the theory and 
evidence presented. 
 
2.2 Urban demography: definitions, measurement and data deficits 
In this chapter, and those that follow, I rely on United Nations population data 
for the quantitative components of the analysis. It is therefore important to 
address at the outset how urban populations are defined and measured, 
address potential sources of systematic bias and highlight key data deficits. 
 
Key definitions 
There is considerable confusion with regards to the terminology associated with 
the study of urbanisation, beginning with the definition of ‘urban’ itself: there is 
no theoretical or practical consensus on the matter. Louis Wirth, a founder of 
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the Chicago School of Sociology, famously defined a city as ‘a relatively large, 
dense, and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals’ (Wirth 
1938, 8). Wirth’s contemporary, eminent urban historian Lewis Mumford, 
offered a somewhat broader definition by including the social division of labour 
as a key characteristic of ‘urbanism’ (Mumford 1937, 93). Both definitions are  
reflected today in the various criteria used by national statistical offices to 
classify human settlements (see below). 
    These definitions are obviously slippery: what distinguishes a large village 
from a small town, or a large town from a small city? At what degree of 
specialisation does the division of labour in a community qualify as ‘urban’ in 
character? There is clearly a spectrum between rural and urban ways of living 
with fuzzy boundaries. Nevertheless, the ‘urban’ remains an enduring 
theoretical construct and has been a focal point of social scientific enquiry for 
well over a century as the world population has come to live in ever-more and 
ever-larger settlements. While there may never be a consensus on the precise 
boundary between the rural and the urban, few would argue with the basic 
claims that life in a small village differs from that in a town or city, and that 
there has been a dramatic increase in the number and size of identifiably 
‘urban’ settlements across the world over the past two hundred years. 
    There is less ambiguity but arguably more confusion with regards to the 
definition of ‘urbanisation’, which is used in the English language in at least 
three ways: a) to refer to the process of rural-urban migration, b) to refer to the 
expansion of built-up areas, and c) to refer to an increase in proportion of a 
nations population living in settlements classified as urban (see Parnell and 
Walawege 2011; Oxford English Dictionary). In this thesis ‘urbanisation’ is used 
specifically to denote a level or increase in the proportion of a national 
population residing in urban areas. 
    Matters are further muddled by the tendency for scholars and policy makers 
alike to conflate urbanisation with urban population growth (or simply ‘urban 
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growth’), which refers specifically to an increase in the absolute number of 
people living in urban settlements rather than the proportion of people living in 
urban settlements.2 While urbanisation and urban growth often go together, 
they are distinct phenomena. It is possible for urban growth to occur without 
urbanisation. For example, many ‘fully’ urbanised countries in North America, 
South America and Europe continue to experience urban population growth 
despite no (or very little) increase in the proportion of people living in urban 
areas. Throughout this thesis I am careful to distinguish between urbanisation 
and urban growth. 
    Another source of confusion is the difference between expressing levels and 
rates of urbanisation. In English the word ‘rate’ can be used to denote a ratio or 
velocity. As a result, the phrase ‘rate of urbanisation’ is sometimes used to refer 
to the percentage of a nation’s population living in urban areas and sometimes 
used to denote the pace of change in the proportion of the population living in 
urban areas. For the sake of clarity, I use the phrase ‘level of urbanisation’ to 
refer to the percentage of a nation’s population living in urban areas and ‘rate of 
urbanisation’ to denote changes in the proportion urban over a specified unit of 
time. 
 
Measuring urban populations: sources, definitions, and potential biases 
In the following chapters I use urban population estimates from the Population 
Division of the United Nations. These estimates are derived primarily from 
national census data and a handful of Sample Surveys. During intercensal years 
estimates are produced with standard population models. As a result, the 
accuracy of population estimates for any given country in any given year 
                                                          
2 For example, in a recent article in which Parnell and Walawege (2011) explicitly discuss the 
definition of urbanisation, they make the mistake of presenting statistics on regional urban 
growth rates as regional rates of urbanisation. 
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depends on the amount of historical data available and the length of time 
between the last census (or sample) and the year of estimation. 
    In sub-Saharan Africa vital registration statistics were scarce and of 
questionable quality prior to the 1970s. Matters improved somewhat in 
subsequent decades. Since the 1994, 45 out 48 countries in the region have 
conducted at least one census (Tabutin and Schoumaker 2004). Nevertheless, 
wide variation remains in the quantity and quality of data available across 
countries. Some, such as Kenya, Ghana and Zambia, have conducted regular 
censuses; others, such as Angola, DR Congo and Somalia have not conducted a 
census for two decades or more (ibid). Consequently, the quality of the 
estimates varies considerably across countries. Unfortunately these are the best 
numbers available to researchers and policy makers alike. There is clearly an 
urgent need to devote more resources to basic demographic data collection in 
the region. 
    Another potential concern is the diversity of criteria that national statistical 
agencies use to classify settlements, drawing into question the comparability of 
urban population estimates across countries (Satterthwaite 2007). Some 
countries use a simple minimum population threshold to classify a settlement 
as urban, although thresholds vary. For example, in Angola, Ethiopia and Sierra 
Leone any settlement with a population of 2000 inhabitants or more is classified 
as urban, while Senegal and Benin use a minimum threshold of 10,000 or more 
inhabitants (United Nations 2012). However, other countries use more elaborate 
criteria. For example, in Zambia urban settlements are ‘Localities of 5,000 
inhabitants or more, with a majority of the labour force not in agricultural 
activities’ while in Namibia urban settlements include ‘The district 
headquarters and other settlements of rapid population growth with facilities 
that encourage people to engage in non-agricultural activities’ (ibid). 
    Given the wide range of criteria used to classify urban settlements, there is a 
legitimate concern that estimates of urban populations are not comparable 
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across countries. In particular, countries with higher population thresholds may 
have lower reported levels of urbanisation and smaller urban populations. For 
the purposes of quantitative analysis, it is therefore important to determine the 
extent to which these different definitional criteria account for cross-country 
variation in urban population estimates.  
    Following Bandyopadhyay and Green (2013), Figure 1.1 shows the 
correlation between a country’s minimum population threshold for urban 
classification and reported urban population size in 2011 for 97 countries 
(including 31 in sub-Saharan Africa); Figure 1.2 shows the correlation between 
the classification threshold and level of urbanisation in 2011 for the same 
sample of countries. In both cases I have selected all countries that explicitly 
include a minimum population threshold for urban classification, even if this is 
not the primary or sole criteria for classification. Data are from United Nations 
(2012). 
    Figure 2.1 indicates a weakly positive correlation between the classification 
threshold and urban population size (R-squared=.030; p=.089), somewhat 
contrary to expectations. Figure 2.2 indicates that there is no correlation 
between classification thresholds and estimated levels of urbanisation (R-
squared=.002; p=.677). 
    Figures 2.3 and 2.4 repeat the exercise with a sample of 54 countries 
(including 18 from sub-Saharan Africa) that use a minimum population 
threshold as the primary or sole criteria for urban classification. With this 
sample there is no significant correlation between thresholds and urban 
population size (R-squared=.029; p=.215), nor between thresholds and estimated 
levels of urbanisation (R-squared=.000; p=.901). 
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Figure 2.1 Correlation between classification 
threshold and urban population in 2011 (n=97) 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Correlation between classification 
threshold and urbanisation in 2011 (n=97) 
 
 
 
Notes for Figures 1.1 & 1.2: Sample includes all countries that have a minimum population threshold for the 
classification of a settlement as urban, even if this is not the primary or sole criterion for classification. 
Ninety-seven countries meet this selection criterion, including 31 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
countries included in this sample are as follows: American Samoa, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, 
Central African Republic, Colombia, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, French 
Polynesia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greenland, Guadeloupe, Guam, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iceland, 
India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, 
Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Martinique, Mauritania, Mayotte, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Portugal, Puerto 
Rico, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Réunion, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, 
Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, 
Uganda, United Kingdom, United States of America, United States Virgin Islands, Venezuela, Viet Nam, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Figure 2.3 Correlation between classification threshold 
and urban population in 2011 (n=54) 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Correlation between classification threshold 
and urbanisation in 2011 (n=54) 
 
 
 
 
Notes for Figures 1.3 & 1.4: Sample includes all countries that use a minimum population threshold as the 
sole or primary criterion for the classification of a settlement as urban. Fifty-four countries meet this 
selection criterion, including 18 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The countries included in this sample are 
as follows: American Samoa, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Central 
African Republic, Colombia, Comoros, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greenland, Guadeloupe, Guinea-Bissau, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Martinique, Mauritania, 
Mayotte, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Viet Nam.     
  
y = 0.6403x + 6329.3 
R² = 0.0294 
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
U
rb
an
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 (
th
o
u
sa
n
d
s)
 
Threshold for urban classification 
y = -0.0001x + 64.492 
R² = 0.0003 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
U
rb
an
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 (
%
 o
f 
to
ta
l)
 
Threshold for urban classification 
37 
 
    An analysis of a sample of sub-Saharan African countries yields similar 
results. For the 31 countries in the region that include a minimum population 
threshold in their classification criteria, there is a weakly positive correlation 
between the threshold and urban population size in 2011 (R-squared=.111; 
p=.067). However, this result is largely driven by Nigeria, which has a high 
minimum threshold and the largest urban population in the sample. If Nigeria 
is excluded there is no correlation between the population threshold and urban 
population size in 2011. Likewise, there is no correlation between the threshold 
and level urbanisation, with or without Nigeria in the sample. An analysis of 
the 17 countries in sub-Saharan Africa that use a minimum population 
threshold as the primary or sole criterion for settlement classification indicates 
no significant correlation between the definitional threshold and urban 
population size or level of urbanisation. 
    In sum, there is little evidence of a statistically significant bias arising from 
variation in classification criteria across countries. However, there is one final 
source of bias to be addressed: changes in classification criteria within countries 
over time.  This is corrected for in each edition of the World Urbanization 
Prospects (published biennially) such that the historical estimates of urban 
populations (from 1950) for any given country are consistent with the current 
classification criteria of that country. Problems of comparability arise if 
estimates from two separate editions of the publication are used for 
comparative purposes. I have avoided combining population estimates from 
different editions to minimise biases arising from changes in classification 
criteria within countries over time.  
 
Data deficits 
Apart from the issues associated with definitional diversity, another major 
obstacle to developing an accurate picture of urban population dynamics in 
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sub-Saharan Africa is the absence of reliable, comparable time-series data on 
vital rates (e.g. fertility and mortality) disaggregated by rural and urban 
residence (United Nations 2001; Tabutin and Schoumaker 2004). This is 
particularly problematic when seeking to disaggregate the components of 
urban population growth into natural increase, migration and reclassification. 
Some efforts have been made utilising indirect estimation, such as the census 
survival ratio method (see United Nations 2001 for the most comprehensive 
effort to date), however these methods are very sensitive to the assumptions 
underpinning them and there are insufficient data points for countries in sub-
Saharan Africa to directly identify clear regional trends. For example, there is only 
enough data to make indirect estimations of the components of urban growth in four 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960s, three in the 1970s and six in the 1980s.  
    Similarly, there is very little socioeconomic or political data available at the 
city or urban level. Basic comparable indicators such as income, employment, 
consumer price inflation, poverty, inequality, land and house prices are simply 
unavailable for a significant number of countries and years. The situation has 
begun to improve since the 1980s with the introduction of rigorously samples 
Demographic and Health Surveys, but large gaps remain in coverage remain. 
There are also no datasets that provide systematic information on local law and 
order, urban government finance and performance, etc.  
    Given these data limitations much of the inference concerning trends and 
interactions is necessarily indirect and must be treated with caution. 
Nevertheless, the existing UN data at the country level provides an opportunity 
to test some hypotheses concerning the macro-trends driving urbanisation and 
urban growth in the region, as well as the phenomena of slums and urban 
protests explored in the chapters to follow. 
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2.3 Integrating economic, demographic and historical theories of urbanisation 
The traditional economic theory of urbanisation, which has dominated in both 
academic and policy circles since the 1950s, revolves around the relationship 
between structural economic change and the spatial dynamics of the labour 
market. The basic premise underpinning the theory is straightforward: as the 
‘modern’ urban sector expands (i.e. manufacturing, industry and services) 
surplus labour from the ‘backward’ rural economy (i.e. agriculture) is ‘pulled’ 
into towns and cities, lured by higher wages (Lewis 1954, Fei and Ranis 1964).  
    However, as early as the 1950s it was recognized that rates of urbanisation in 
many developing countries were incommensurate with the growth of waged 
employment opportunities in urban areas, resulting in under- and 
unemployment—a phenomenon dubbed ‘over-urbanization’ (Davis and 
Golden 1954).  To explain this deviation from the classic ‘dual-economy’ model 
of urbanisation, and the implied failure of the market to allocate labour 
efficiently between rural and urban areas, Haris and Todaro (1970) proposed a 
revised model in which migration decisions are influenced by expected as 
opposed to actual earnings in the urban sector. ‘Over-urbanisation’ is explained 
in the Haris-Todaro model (HTM) as a consequence of wage-distorting 
government interventions in the labour market that inflate the wages of a few 
and the expectations of the masses. In such contexts, the model suggests that 
wage-equalization or mobility restriction policies will lead to net welfare 
improvements. 
    While decades of empirical studies have consistently demonstrated a strong 
cross-sectional association between indicators of economic development (e.g. 
income per capita and structure of output) and levels of urbanisation at the 
national level, empirical tests of the wage-differential mechanism assumed in 
both the classical model and HTM have produced ambiguous results, 
explaining only a small fraction of the variation in rates of urbanisation across 
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countries (see Mazumdar 1987, Jamal and Weeks 1988, Weeks 1995, Becker and 
Morrison 1995, Fay and Opal 2000, Lall, Selod and Shalizi 2006). This may 
reflect the failure of standard economic models to account for the role of the 
urban informal sector (the ‘third sector’), which is where most migrants 
(especially in Africa) end up (Bhattacharya 1993).3 It is also likely a consequence 
of a narrow focus on positive economic incentives for migration.  
    A large body of qualitative and quantitative studies conducted in the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s identified a diverse range of non-economic ‘pull’ factors 
influencing migration decisions, such as a desire to take advantage of the ‘thick’ 
market for spouses in urban areas, acquire the social prestige associated with 
urban life or pursue adventure in the ‘bright lights’ of the big city (see Byerlee 
1974, Mazumdar 1987, Jamal and Weeks 1988, Becker and Morrison 1995). 
Conversely, myriad ‘push’ factors were also identified, such as the desire of 
youth to escape the control of older generations, of women to escape gender 
discrimination, and of rural households to diversify income streams by sending 
a family member to town in the hopes of receiving remittances (ibid). More 
recent studies have explored the impacts of ethnic conflict, war and climatic 
variation in driving forced migration to urban areas (Fay and Opal 2000, 
Barrios, Bertinelli and Strobl 2006). In other words, economic distress—not just 
economic development—can spur rural-urban migration, and there are many 
non-economic motivations that influence individual decisions to move. Given 
the many reasons people leave the countryside for the city it is not surprising 
that empirical studies have failed to confirm the primacy of the wage-
differential mechanism. 
    In sum, there is clear evidence of a strong association between levels of 
economic development and levels of urbanisation. However, the pace of urban 
                                                          
3 The lack of comparable data on informal sector wages precludes the possibility of accurately 
determining the influence of wage differentials between rural areas and the urban informal 
economy. 
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population change is only partially explained by income growth and wage gaps 
between rural and urban areas, indicating that standard economic theories are 
incomplete. Indeed, in an empirical study explicitly designed to solve the 
paradox of ‘urbanisation without growth’ in sub-Saharan Africa throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, Fay and Opal (2000) note that in many regions—not just 
Africa—‘urbanization continues even during periods of negative [economic] 
growth, carried by its own momentum’ (25). The only explanation the authors 
provide for this momentum is a vague speculation that external forces (e.g. 
‘globalization’) may be at work.  
    An obvious omission from the standard models of urbanisation advanced by 
development economists, which have been so influential in policy circles (see 
Chapter 3), is attention to the demographic underpinnings of urban population 
change. 
    Unlike economists, who have generally sought to account for rural-urban 
migration and urbanisation, demographers tend to focus on the factors driving 
urban growth—i.e. growth in the absolute size of urban populations. They 
begin with the premise that urban population growth has three proximate 
causes: 1) natural increase, 2) net in-migration and 3) reclassification (Cohen 
2003). Although significant from a statistical methodology point of view, 
reclassification is generally a by-product of natural increase and migration, so 
the focus here is on these factors.4 
    Demographers attribute changes in urban natural increase and rural-urban 
migration to population dynamics associated with the demographic transition 
(DT). In brief, the DT involves a secular decline in mortality rates followed by a 
secular decline in fertility rates, shifting a population from a wasteful cycle of 
reproduction in which many babies are born but the majority die before 
                                                          
4 Reclassification is effectively a political/administrative dynamic, but it is closely related to the 
first and second factors as settlements are generally reclassified as urban (as opposed to rural) 
once they reach a certain population threshold. 
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reaching adulthood to an efficient cycle in which fewer babies are born but 
most survive. Importantly, this transition is everywhere associated with a 
period of rapid population expansion due to the fact that mortality decline 
precedes fertility decline, creating a substantial window of time in which births 
far exceed deaths in a population.  
    In relation to urban growth, the onset of mortality decline ahead of fertility 
decline in urban areas raises the rate of urban natural increase and urban 
populations expand, regardless of whether or not they are net recipients of 
rural migrants. Theoretically urbanisation could occur in a population without 
rural-to-urban migration if urban natural increase were to exceed rural natural 
increase over a sustained period, but this is very rare.5 Generally speaking, 
rural-urban migration underpins the shift in the proportion of the population 
living in urban areas. It assumed by demographers that mortality decline in 
rural areas results in a population boom that contributes to the ‘push’ factors 
that drive people into cities as population pressure strains natural resources 
(such as land and water) resulting in declining living standards and rural 
misery (Preston 1979, Kelley and Williamson 1984).  
    There is ample empirical evidence that mortality decline, and the acceleration 
in population growth that follows, is an important driver of urban population 
growth. For example, Preston (1979) demonstrated a strong one-to-one 
correlation between total population growth and urban growth, and many 
studies have noted that urban natural increase generally contributes more to 
overall urban population growth than rural-to-urban migration does, although 
the relative contributions of each tend to shift as a country urbanizes with 
natural increase playing an increasingly important role (e.g. Davis 1965, Preston 
1979, Cohen 2003, Lall, Selod and Shalizi 2006).  
                                                          
5 Dyson (2010b) provides evidence that urban natural increase outpaced rural natural increase 
around the turn of the 20th century in Sweden and again in the immediate aftermath of World 
War II, but this is an exceptional case of relatively brief periods of urbanization without 
migration. 
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    By contrast, cross-country evidence on the broader relationships between 
mortality decline, population growth and urbanisation is virtually non-
existent—a surprising omission from the demographic literature. Indeed, I have 
been unable to locate a single cross-country study that tests these relationships. 
According to Dyson (2010b) the paucity of evidence concerning the 
demographic drivers of urbanisation is largely due to the fact that urbanisation 
‘has not ranked highly on the intellectual agenda’ of demographers. 
    However, there is a small but compelling body of historical demographic and 
economic research that provides support for the view that a secular decline in 
mortality rates is a necessary and possibly sufficient condition for urbanisation 
to occur. 
    As Figure 2.5 illustrates, the world’s urban population remained roughly 
constant for thousands of years, hovering around 5% of the global population, 
before growing explosively from the middle of the 19th century. What accounts 
for these trends? The answer provided by historical demographers is that cities 
were deadly places to live until recently. Prior to the 19th century, urban 
settlements with rudimentary water and sanitation infrastructure were 
uniquely conducive to the spread of infectious and parasitic diseases. As a 
consequence, death rates tended to exceed birth rates rendering cities 
‘demographic sinks’ (Graunt 1662/1964, de Vries 1984, Bairoch 1988, Lowry 
1990, Dyson 2010b). With negative rates of natural increase, urban settlements 
everywhere depended upon a constant inflow of rural migrants to sustain their 
populations.  
    This is an important observation. The fact that cities formed and grew despite 
consuming more people than they were capable of producing indicates that a 
constant flow of rural migrants was necessary for cities to exist for any length of 
time in the pre-industrial era. In turn, this suggests that the propensity to 
migrate out of rural areas and settle in large agglomerations has been a 
perennial feature of human behaviour for as long as cities have existed—even 
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when migrants stood to suffer from higher rates of morbidity and mortality 
than they would have in the countryside. This is consistent with the evidence 
cited above concerning the many reasons people move to cities, even when it is 
not apparently rational from an economic perspective. 
 
Figure 2.5 World population and urbanisation, 1000 AD – 2000 AD 
 
Sources: Population estimates from Maddison (2009); urbanisation 
estimates from Grauman (1977) and (United Nations 2010) 
 
    This theory also suggests that lowering mortality through disease control is a 
necessary condition for urban populations to expand. Where the burden of 
disease is eased, mortality decline in urban areas contributes to urban 
population growth by raising the rate of urban natural increase and 
transforming any rural migrants into a source of urban population growth 
instead of mere maintenance.  
    Disease is not, however, the only factor that determines mortality rates in a 
population. Indeed, economic historians provide a complimentary explanation 
for the limited scale of urbanisation prior to the 19th century based on a 
compelling logical premise: cities can only exist where a surplus of food is 
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available to support a large non-agricultural population (Lowry 1990). It 
follows that the size of the urban population in any given region is first and 
foremost a function of the quantity of food surplus it is able to acquire, which in 
turn is jointly determined by two factors: 1) agricultural productivity and 2) 
transportation costs (Bairoch 1988).  
    To appreciate the significance of these basic determinants of urban 
population size, it is useful to consider the role of each at both local and global 
scales. Historically, the amount of food that could be produced within a given 
region determined the surplus available to support an urban population in that 
region (Bairoch 1988). However, improvements in transport technology 
eventually made it possible to import food from other regions, rendering the 
potential amount of surplus that urban populations could theoretically acquire 
a dual function of local productivity and transport costs (ibid). At the global 
level, the state of agricultural productivity at any given time determines the 
absolute amount of surplus available to support the world’s urban population, 
and transport costs determine the extent to which surplus can be moved from 
more-productive to less-productive regions. 
    The history of ancient Rome provides a useful illustration of this point. At its 
peak in 200 AD the city contained over one million residents (including both 
citizens and slaves)—a population size that far exceeded the total surplus 
production capacity of the Italian peninsula. To satisfy its energy requirements 
the city was forced to import approximately 75-95% of its wheat supplies from 
distant territorial possessions. Given the state of transportation technology at 
the time, this was an extremely costly means of surplus acquisition and 
contributed to the financial ruin of the empire. With the relocation of the 
imperial capital to Constantinople in 330 AD and the subsequent collapse of the 
publically financed inter-regional grain distribution system, Rome’s population 
plummeted to just fifty thousand inhabitants in 700 AD—a size much more in 
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line with the productive capacity of its hinterland (see Bairoch 1988 and Reader 
2004). 
    The limitations on urban population growth imposed by agricultural 
productivity and transport costs largely explain the geography of early urban 
settlements, which emerged almost exclusively in areas naturally conducive to 
surplus food production (e.g. fertile river valleys) or locations with naturally 
low trade costs (i.e. on coasts and along rivers) (Childe 1950, Davis 1955, 
Bairoch 1988). These limitations also explain why the proportion of the world’s 
urban population remained unchanged for so long. Increasing agricultural 
output in the pre-modern era was driven primarily by bringing more land 
under cultivation rather than by factor productivity growth, so although the 
global urban population may have edged up in absolute terms, it could not 
expand in relative terms because there was very limited improvement in surplus 
output.6 Moreover, the potential for regional specialization and exchange in 
agricultural goods was heavily restricted given that transportation costs 
remained well above the threshold that would have made large-scale trade in 
staple foodstuffs economically viable (Braudel 1984, Bairoch 1988).7  
    In sum, disease control and food security are required to keep mortality in 
check in urban areas. The rise and fall of cities and urban populations in the 
pre-industrial era can therefore be understood as a reflection of both shifting 
disease burdens and fluctuations in the capacity of individual settlements to 
secure adequate food supplies.  
    A confluence of social and technological changes in Northern Europe in the 
18th and 19th centuries paved the way for European urbanisation by 
                                                          
6 Angus Maddison’s historical estimates of world population and GDP indicate that per capita 
output increased from $412 in 1AD to just $606 in 1700 (expressed in 1990 International Geary-
Khamis dollars). From this we can infer that factor productivity growth was marginal over this 
period. In other words, there was very little increase in energy surplus per capita.  
7 The bulk of world trade in the pre-industrial era involved relatively lightweight, non-
perishable and high-value items such as spices and luxury textiles (see Braudel 1984, Bairoch 
1988). 
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dramatically improving food security and disease control, as well as increasing 
demand for labour in urban areas. Innovations such as nitrogen fertilizer, crop 
rotation and mechanization drove a surge in agricultural productivity (Bairoch 
1988, Cameron 1997, Maddison 2007). The harnessing of inanimate sources of 
energy to fuel railroads, steamships and eventually automobiles, led to a 
dramatic reduction in transportation costs (Bairoch 1988, Crafts and Venables 
2003). Improvements in hygiene, medical knowledge, maternal education, 
urban planning practices and the expanded availability of healthcare sparked a 
secular decline in mortality rates in urban and rural areas (Szreter 1997, Bloom 
and Sachs 1999, Reher 2004, Livi-Bacci 2007). Political-institutional changes such 
as the consolidation of private property rights, improved third-party contract 
enforcement and an expansion of the role of governments in the provision of 
public goods (i.e. healthcare, education and infrastructure) served to reinforce 
and sustain these trends (Szreter 1997, Cameron 1997, Maddison 2007). 
Collectively, these changes catalyzed a permanent shift in Europe from a 
Malthusian economy characterized by stagnant per capita income growth and 
high mortality to a modern growth regime characterized by secular 
improvements in factor productivity and life expectancy (Galor and Weil 1999). 
And this shift coincided with the emergence of rising demand for labour in 
urban areas as industrial manufacturing took root.  
    Against this backdrop of rising productivity, intensified regional trade and 
falling mortality, and a structural transformation in production the stage was 
set for European urbanisation.8 Between 1800 and 1900, the proportion of 
                                                          
8 In a cross-country statistical study, Bairoch and Goertz (1986) demonstrated that the pace 
urbanization in nineteenth-century Europe was driven primarily by changes in agricultural 
productivity, by the pace of industrial growth and the expansion of trade. However, they found 
evidence that the most important factors driving urbanization varied over time within and 
between countries.  In particular, their results concerning the role of agricultural productivity 
were ambiguous. In some models the coefficient was positive suggesting that rising output 
facilitated urbanization, while in others the coefficient was negative. They speculate that 
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Europe’s population living in urban settlements nearly tripled (growing from 
around 10 percent to 30 percent), and by the turn of the millennium 
approximately 70 percent of the region’s population lived in urban areas 
(Bairoch and Goertz 1986; United Nations 2010).  
    Through trade, colonialism and (in the latter half of the 20th century) 
international development assistance, many of the key technological and 
institutional developments that drove mortality decline in Europe were 
diffused to other regions, including sub-Saharan Africa. However, Europe’s 
industrial success was not.  The result in many regions has been improvements 
in disease control and food security, the onset of mortality decline, rapid 
population growth and urbanisation, even in places where economic 
development (in the form of expansion and diversification of output) has been 
limited. This indicates that mortality decline itself may be a sufficient condition 
for urbanisation and urban growth. According to Dyson (2010a), ‘No 
population that has experienced a reduction in its death rate from a high level 
to a low level has failed to urbanize’ (126). This hypothesis has not, however, 
been tested empirically using cross-country regression analysis. 
    Figure 2.6 provides a stylized illustration of how economic, demographic, 
sociological and historical perspectives on the dynamics driving urbanisation 
and urban population growth can be integrated into a single explanatory 
framework. Economic development may serve to stimulate rural-urban 
migration, but there are negative economic motives and many non-economic 
ones as well. As a result, a steady stream of rural migrants should be expected. 
Importantly, these migrants only become sources of population growth where 
birth rates exceed deaths. In turn, mortality decline is essentially a function of 
disease control and food security. Where these are achieved, mortality decline 
                                                                                                                                                                          
agricultural success in certain regions resulted in the retention rather than release of rural 
labour.  
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can directly contribute to urban population growth by raising the rate of urban 
natural increase above zero, and indirectly by accelerating population growth 
in rural areas, which places pressure on natural resources and generally 
increases the pool of potential migrants. Similarly, mortality decline facilitates 
urbanisation not only by increasing migrant flows, but also transforming 
migrants from a source of urban population maintenance to a source of urban 
growth. If the net direction of migration is into urban settlements, which history 
suggests is indeed the case, this will ultimately serve to increase the proportion 
of the national population living in urban settlements resulting in urbanisation. 
 
Figure 2.6 An integrated framework for analysing urbanisation and urban growth 
 
 
    In sum, mortality decline and subsequent population growth are clearly 
sufficient conditions for urban growth. If we accept the premise that there is, on 
balance, a net tendency towards in-migration into urban areas driven by a 
variety of economic and non-economic push and pull factors, mortality decline 
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driven by improvements in disease control and food security can also be seen as 
a sufficient condition for urbanisation to occur in a population. 
    Using this integrated framework as a guide, I now turn my attention to 
accounting for the stylized facts of sub-Saharan Africa’s urban transition, 
beginning with the relatively late onset of urbanisation and urban growth in the 
region, and the acceleration of both trends in the colonial era.  
 
2.4 Geography, colonialism and early urbanisation in Africa 
Archaeological evidence and oral histories confirm the presence of urban 
settlements in sub-Saharan Africa for over 2000 years (Anderson and Rathbone 
2000). However, these settlements remained relatively small, few and far 
between in comparison to other regions of the world, and most proved 
ephemeral. As Figure 2.7 illustrates it was not until the middle of the 20th 
century that Africa’s urban transition got underway. 
 
Figure 2.7 Levels of urbanisation by major world region, 1850-2050 
 
Sources: Grauman (1977) and United Nations (2010) 
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Building on the framework presented above, the late onset of Africa’s urban 
transition may be explained by natural geographical endowments. Africa’s 
climate, soils, topography and disease ecology represent considerable obstacles 
to surplus agricultural production (Diamond 1998, Bloom and Sachs 1999); a 
large land area-to-coastline ratio, few navigable rivers and low population 
densities are significant natural barriers to trade, contributing to exceptionally 
high transportation costs in the region (even today) and limited scope for 
specialization and innovation (Bloom and Sachs 1999); and climatic and 
ecological characteristics render Africa uniquely conducive to infectious and 
parasitic diseases, the consequences of which are evidenced by the fact that sub-
Saharan Africa has consistently suffered the highest mortality rates in the world 
since comparable records became available in the 1950s (Bloom and Sachs 1999, 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, Iliffe 2007). In other words, natural 
geographic endowments present significant obstacles to achieving the level of 
food security and disease control required to sustain urban settlement.  
    Despite the profound technological and institutional changes that have 
spurred urban transitions across the world over the past two centuries, it is still 
possible to detect the influence of geographical endowments on differential 
trajectories of urbanisation and urban growth. As noted above, access to 
surplus food supplies was a key constraint on early urbanisation. Prior to the 
advent of production and transport technologies that facilitated the boom in 
surplus food production and exchange that began in the 18th century, the two 
factors that determined a particular settlement’s access to surplus was the 
agricultural potential of its immediate hinterland and transportation costs. We 
can therefore hypothesise that countries with greater agricultural potential and 
naturally lower transportation costs began urbanising earlier than those with 
limited agricultural potential and higher trade costs.  
    This hypothesis can be tested using an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression analysis in which a country’s level of urbanisation is modelled as a 
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function of relatively time-invariant geographical characteristics that influence 
agricultural productivity and transportation costs. This is done by estimating 
the following equations: 
 
(1)                                                                  
                               
 
(2)                                                                   
                                                     
 
In equation (1) the dependent variable is the percentage of the population in 
country i living in urban areas in 1960. In equation (2) the dependent variable is 
absolute size of the urban population in country i in 1960. Values for the Urban 
population (%) variable were square root transformed and all urban population 
and national population estimates were log transformed in this analysis and the 
subsequent OLS models presented below. 
    In both equations, the key independent variables include the length of 
coastline in kilometres and total length of navigable waterways in kilometres  
(both log transformed), and soil quality (measured as the percentage of a 
country’s land area that has soils that are very or moderately suitable for six key 
rain-fed crops). I also include the crude death rate for country i in 1960 and the 
log of GDP per capita in 1960 given that these variables are expected to account 
for a significant fraction of variation in levels of urbanisation and urban 
population. In equation (2) an added control for national population size is 
introduced due to the natural correlation between total population and urban 
population size (Davis and Henderson 2003). Ideally, this empirical 
‘endowment’ model would also account for differential disease ecologies across 
countries. Unfortunately, a lack of readily available data from the pre-1800 era 
(i.e. prior to European colonial influence) renders this impossible. Full details of 
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all variables and sources can be found in Appendix A; descriptive statistics and 
a correlation matrix are presented in Appendix B. 
    Table 2.2 presents the results of these models based on a sample of 126 
countries for which data are available. The results show that countries with 
better soil quality and more extensive ‘natural’ transportation infrastructure 
were both more urbanised (column 1) and had larger overall urban populations 
(column 2) in 1960 than countries that were less favourably endowed, as 
predicted. There is some colinearity in this model: countries with longer 
coastlines tend to have more kilometres of navigable waterways. While this 
obscures accurate interpretation of effect magnitudes for these variables, it does 
not affect the overall fit of the model. 
 
Table 2.2 Geography, urbanisation and urban population in 1960 
 
Level of 
Urbanisation 
Urban 
population 
 (1) (2) 
Ln Coastline (km) .049* 
(.028) 
.054*** 
(.016) 
Ln Waterways (km) .045** 
(.022) 
.036*** 
(.014) 
Soil potential .022** 
(.008) 
.012*** 
(.004) 
Crude death rate, 1960 -.058*** 
(.015) 
-.023*** 
(.008) 
Ln GDP per capita, 1960 1.507*** 
(.118) 
.556*** 
(.064) 
Ln national pop  .975*** 
(.034) 
R-squared .822 .945 
Observations 126 126 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Significance at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels are indicated by ***, **, * respectively. 
 
The case for causality in this model is fairly strong: the time-invariant 
characteristics of coastline, waterways and soil potential are clearly exogenous 
to urbanisation and urban population size in 1960.  Moreover, the inclusion of 
the crude death rate and GDP per capita in 1960 as a control variables should 
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capture the influence of many omitted variables that might confound the 
influence of geography (such as the presence of public health programs or 
variation in access to antibiotics). While it is possible that these correlations are 
spurious, or driven by some important omitted variable, they are consistent 
with the argument that geographical endowments have had some influence on 
trajectories of urbanisation and urban growth. It is likely that the inclusion of 
disease burden data would improve the explanatory power of the model. 
    Improvements in food security and disease control—and hence mortality 
decline—began in the colonial era. In the early colonial period the slave trade, 
violence, the introduction of foreign pathogens and the disruption of traditional 
systems of production and networks of trade contributed to a shrinking of 
Africa’s population (Iliffe 2007). However, after World War I (WWI) European 
powers began to invest more heavily in primary commodity production, 
launched health campaigns to combat epidemic diseases, expanded transport 
infrastructure and introduced new agricultural technologies and cultigens such 
as cassava, which is drought resistant and has become an important anti-famine 
crop across Africa (Iliffe 2007, Clapham 2006). While these changes collectively 
stimulated a secular decline in mortality rates in the region, urbanisation 
remained limited between WWI and World War II due to colonial restrictions 
on African mobility and residence in urban areas, poor living conditions in 
urban areas and limited waged employment opportunities.  
    After WWII colonial powers (especially Britain and France) changed tack and 
launched a ‘modernization’ drive designed to prepare colonies for eventual 
independence. This involved a significant expansion of public education and 
health services, further infrastructure development and some (limited) 
industrial investments (Cooper 2002, Iliffe 2007). Vaccination schemes led to a 
sharp reduction in mortality associated with epidemic diseases, child mortality 
rates began to fall due to better treatments for afflictions such as polio, measles, 
diarrhoea and malnutrition, and improved road and rail transport contributed 
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to reductions in famine related mortality by rendering affected areas more 
accessible to emergency aid (Iliffe 2007, Boone and Faguet 1998). As mortality 
rates fell, Africa’s population began to grow rapidly. The gradual relaxation of 
restrictions on African mobility coupled with higher demand for labour in 
urban areas during and immediately after World War II accelerated rural-to-
urban migration, which exacerbated poor housing conditions and drove 
consumer price inflation and unemployment—issues that proved instrumental 
in catalyzing the growth of the union movement, which played a pivotal role in 
securing independence in the region (Cooper 2002, Iliffe 2007). 
    In sum, Africa’s urban transition was set in motion by technologies and 
institutions introduced in the late colonial period that improved food security 
and disease control, which in turn led to falling mortality rates. However, the 
nature and impact of colonialism varied widely across countries within the 
region, and this variation provides a means of assessing the relative impact of 
colonialism on urbanisation trends. We can hypothesise that those countries in 
which colonial powers were more economically and politically active 
experienced higher degrees of technological and institutional transfer and 
therefor more rapid mortality decline and urban population growth. To test this 
hypothesis we can use three separate indicators of colonial influence: relative 
colonial investment, an indicator of relative direct vs. indirect rule derived from 
legal records, and an indicator of colonial administrative depth.  
    Figures 2.8 and 2.9 present evidence that variation in levels of colonial capital 
investment in African territories is correlated with variation in early 
urbanisation in the region. In both figures the X-axis represents the total 
amount of publically listed capital investments in European colonial territories 
between 1870 and 1936, as catalogued by Frankel (1969). In Figure 2.8, the Y-
axis represents the relative size of the urban population for the corresponding 
territory in 1950; in Figure 2.9 the Y-axis represents the proportion of the 
territory’s population living in urban areas in 1950 (the earliest date for which 
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comparable figures are available). Despite the fact that only twenty 
observations are available, there is a clear correlation between early colonial 
investment and early urbanisation in the region. 
 
Figure 2.8 Colonial investment and urban population size in 1950 
 
Notes for Figures 2.8 & 2.9: Colonial investment data is from Frankel 
(1969); population estimates are drawn from United Nations 
(2010). I have used only Frankel’s estimates of publically listed 
capital investments for 20 colonial territories. As the boundaries of 
these territories do not correspond to the contemporary national 
boundaries used in UN population statistics population data were 
aggregated for all contemporary countries that correspond to 
Frankel’s colonial territories. 
 
 
The direction of causality assumed in Figure 2.8 could be challenged by the 
argument that colonisers invested more where there were larger African 
populations (and hence a larger pool of labour to exploit). Given that total 
population and urban population are highly correlated, this is a potentially 
valid criticism. However, given the paucity of pre-colonial urban settlements in 
the region, it is unlikely that colonizers invested in areas with existing urban 
populations, so the assumed causal link between colonial investment and urban 
population size is reasonable. Moreover, total population and levels of 
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urbanisation are not closely correlated. Consequently the assumed direction of 
causality in Figure 2.9 is robust to this challenge. In results not reported here, 
Frankel’s colonial investment figures were also found to be negatively 
correlated with crude death rates in 1950 and positively correlated with income 
per capita in 1950, consistent with the hypothesis that colonial investment had 
the dual effect of reducing mortality and improving access to surplus food 
supplies. 
Figure 2.9 Colonial investment and level of urbanisation in 1950 
 
 
 
More evidence of colonial influence can be identified using OLS regression 
analysis. Table 2.3 presents a series of bivariate correlations between two 
different indicators of colonial influence (the independent variables) on the one 
hand and a range of variables that relate to disease control, food security and 
urbanisation (the dependent variables) on the other.  
    In the upper half of the table, the independent variable is a measure of 
‘indirect rule’ in 33 former British colonies developed by Lange (2004). The 
indirect rule index reflects the percentage of legal cases settled by ‘traditional’ 
authorities as opposed to formal courts in 1955. The higher this percentage, the 
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more British authorities were relying on local power brokers to maintain order 
in their territories. Using this index, Lange (2004) has demonstrated that higher 
degrees of colonial indirect rule resulted in less effective public institutions in 
the postcolonial period. In the lower half of the table, the independent variable 
is the number of colonial civil servants per capita in British and French colonial 
territories in Africa circa 1936, as calculated by Richens (2009). This serves as a 
proxy for administrative depth. As with capital investment, it is reasonable to 
suppose that higher degrees of direct political rule and administrative depth 
resulted in greater technological and institutional transfer and diffusion, and 
hence more favourable conditions for early urbanisation. 
    The dependent variables in Table 2.3 include the infant mortality rate in 1960, 
food supply in 1960 (measured in calories per capita per day), the number of 
registered physicians per 1000 population around 1960, the average annual rate 
of change in the infant mortality rate in the 15 years after 1960, the level of 
urbanisation in 1960 and total urban population in 1960. Controls (apart from 
the necessary inclusion of national population in column 6) are omitted due to 
the small sample sizes of the colonial data and hence very restricted degrees of 
freedom.  
    The results indicate that higher degrees of indirect rule are associated with 
higher infant mortality, lesser food surplus and fewer physicians per capita in 
1960 (columns 1a-6a), while greater administrative depth is associated with 
lower infant mortality rates, greater food surplus and more physicians per 
capita in 1960 (columns 1b-6b). The direction of causality in these correlations is 
not necessarily clear. As Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) have argued, 
patterns of colonial settlement may have been influenced by the disease 
environment and agricultural potential of a region, so these correlations could 
be interpreted as suffering from reverse causality. In other words, colonizers 
may have invested economically and politically in territories with lower disease 
burdens and greater agricultural potential.  
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Table 2.3 Colonial origins of variation in mortality, food security and early urbanisation trends 
 
IMR 1960 
Calories 
per capita 
Physicians 
per 1000 
∆ IMR 
1960-1975 
Urbanisati
on, 1960 
Urban 
population, 
1960 
 Former British colonies 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) 
Indirect rule .012*** 
(.002) 
-.002*** 
(.001) 
-.023*** 
(.004) 
.026*** 
(.007) 
-.044*** 
(.008) 
-.022*** 
(.005) 
Ln population      1.091*** 
(.073) 
R-squared .654 .259 .576 .299 .462 .889 
Observations 33 31 33 33 33 33 
       
 Former African colonies 
 (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b) 
Col. Civ. Serv. -.088* 
(.044) 
.090*** 
(.029) 
.690*** 
(.177) 
-.458*** 
(.140) 
.600** 
(.271) 
.429** 
(.187) 
Ln population      1.137*** 
(.129) 
R-squared .120 .252 .352 .269 .144 .735 
Observations 31 31 30 31 31 31 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are indicated by 
***, **, * respectively. See Appendix A for full details of sources and definitions of variables. 
 
 
    However, mortality decline in the independence period was more likely 
driven by the further diffusion of technologies and the consolidation of 
institutions introduced during the colonial period that affect public health, 
rather than the influence of existing conditions. As column 4 shows, African 
countries that had more robust colonial legal institutions and greater colonial 
administrative capacity experienced more rapid declines in infant mortality in 
the early postcolonial period than those that experienced less colonial 
institutional and administrative investment. In this case the direction of 
causality is clear: postcolonial changes in mortality cannot logically have driven 
colonial settlement patterns. Finally, columns 5 and 6 confirm the association 
demonstrated above between colonial capital investment and early 
urbanisation: the indirect rule and administrative depth indicators are both 
60 
 
significantly correlated with the size and percentage of a country’s urban 
population in 1960. 
    While no single piece of this statistical mosaic provides definitive 
confirmation that urbanisation in African was historically inhibited by 
unfavourable geographic endowments and ultimately set in motion by 
technologies and institutions introduced by European colonizers, collectively 
the evidence provides significant support for these arguments. 
 
2.5 Urbanisation and urban growth in the post-colonial era 
The surge in urban populations that began in the late colonial period 
accelerated in the independence era due to a confluence of demographic, 
political and economic factors. The mortality decline that began in the late 
colonial era continued while fertility rates remained exceptionally high 
resulting in a population boom of historically unprecedented scale.9 Many 
countries experienced a surge in rural-urban migration in the early 
independence era—a postcolonial ‘adjustment’ effect—spurred by the 
elimination of residence restrictions in urban areas and a sharp increase in 
urban employment opportunities due to the expansion and Africanization of 
civil service administrations and investments in urban public works (Miner 
1967, Jamal and Weeks 1988, Stren and Halfani 2001, Iliffe 2007). And economic 
growth rates in the region reached historic highs in this era, fuelled by a boom 
in public and private investment (much of which was provided by international 
actors) and strong growth in commodity exports (ibid). As a result, rates of 
urbanisation and urban population growth reached exceptional heights 
between 1960 and 1975 (see Table 2.4). 
 
                                                          
9 This lag between mortality decline and fertility decline is usually explained as a consequence 
of historical factors that have rendered high birth rates culturally desirable in the region (see 
Iliffe 2007 and Clapham 2009). 
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Table 2.4 Demographic and economic trends in Africa 
 1960-1975 1975-1990 1990-2005 
Urban population growth 5.06 4.57 4.04 
Rate of urbanisation 2.53 1.77 1.45 
GDP per capita growth 2.07 -0.56 0.45 
Population growth 2.53 2.80 2.58 
Notes: Calculated based on data from World Bank World Development 
Indicators Database, accessed January, 2012. GDP growth rate estimates 
based on real GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$). 
 
However, unsustainable fiscal expansion, poor macroeconomic management, 
deteriorating terms of trade and a global recession following the 1973 oil price 
shock resulted in a region-wide economic crisis. By the early 1980s sub-Saharan 
Africa was experiencing negative per capita income growth and fiscal 
retrenchment in the form of donor-imposed structural adjustment programmes. 
The consequences were severe in urban areas. Public and private sector 
employment contracted sharply, real wages declined, investments in housing 
and urban infrastructure came to a virtual standstill and the yawning rural-
urban wage gap that arose in the early independence era essentially vanished 
(Jamal and Weeks 1988, Potts 1995, Weeks 1995, Becker and Morrison 1995). Yet 
urbanisation and urban growth rates remained generally high in the region, 
with a few notable exceptions. Drawing on the framework introduced above, 
this could be explained by continued mortality decline, which sustained high 
rates of population growth. 
    Figure 2.10 shows trends in size of the region’s urban population, the amount 
of food available (measured as the total number of tons of cereals and starchy 
roots produced domestically and imported), the crude death rate and GDP per 
capita. All indices have been converted to index numbers with 1980 set as the 
base year (1980=100). See Appendix A for details of data sources. 
    The figure shows that food supplies generally kept pace with urbanisation 
and urban population growth, and mortality rates fell throughout the period, 
even as GDP per capita declined from the late 1970s. This is a very crude way of 
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testing the argument, but these region-wide trends are consistent with the view 
that mortality decline is sufficient to maintain urbanisation and urban 
population growth even in the face of economic contraction. All of these 
indicators are measured at the national level. To develop a more nuanced 
perspective it would be useful to have data on food supply, mortality rates and 
wages broken down by sector. Unfortunately, as noted above, these data are not 
available for a large cross-section of countries.    
 
Figure 2.10 Urban population, food supply, mortality and GDP per capita in sub-Saharan 
Africa, 1961-2000
 
Notes: Regional population figures and crude death rate estimates are from the United Nations 
Population Division database accessed December 2013. Regional food supply data are from FAOSTAT 
online database, accessed June 2010.  Food supply is the total number of tons of cereals (excluding 
beer) and starchy roots derived from both local production and imports. Regional GDP per capita 
estimates are in constant 2000 US$ and are from World Bank World Development Indicators database, 
accessed January 2014. All series were converted to index numbers with 1980 serving as the base year 
(1980=100). 
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It is worth considering the most well-known exception to this overall trend of 
persistent urbanisation and urban population growth in the face of economic 
crisis. Zambia actually experienced de-urbanisation in the 1980s and 1990s. This 
is generally attributed to a severe economic crisis and the effects of structural 
adjustment on urban income and livelihoods (Potts 1995), yet many other 
countries experienced similar crises without de-urbanisation. However, Zambia 
also experienced a sharp decline in food supplies and a reversal in the trend of 
declining mortality beginning in the late 1970s due to a crisis in the public 
health sector, deteriorating nutrition, and increases in malaria and HIV/AIDS 
related mortality (Dyson 2003; Garenne and Gakusi 2006). Evidence indicates 
that the crisis was particularly acute in urban areas: under-five mortality rates 
rose much faster in urban areas than in rural ones between the mid-1970s and 
early 1990s and fell faster (from the mid-1990s) in rural areas than in urban ones 
(Garenne and Gakusi 2006).  
    As Figure 2.11 illustrates, these trends map directly onto Zambia’s episode of 
de-urbanisation. While some of the factors that contributed to rising mortality 
rates were a direct consequence of Zambia’s economic crisis, others (such as 
rises in malaria and HIV/AIDS mortality) were independent of it (Garenne and 
Gakusi 2006). In other words, Zambia experienced a unique confluence of 
misfortunes which appear to have undermined food security and disease 
control in urban areas—the prerequisites for urbanisation—and in this case 
resulted in a rare case of de-urbanisation. It is worth noting, however, that 
despite a negative shift in the proportion of the population living in urban 
areas, Zambia’s urban population continued to grow in absolute terms. This is 
unlikely to be a consequence of in-migration, given well-documented evidence 
of out-migration during this period (see Potts 1995). A more likely explanation 
is that Zambia’s rate of urban natural increase remained positive during this 
period despite an apparent uptick in urban mortality rates. 
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Figure 2.11 The case of de-urbanisation in Zambia 
 
Notes: National population figures and crude death rate estimates are from the United Nations 
Population Division database accessed December 2013. Food supply data are from FAOSTAT 
online database, accessed June 2010.  Food supply is the number of tons of cereals (excluding 
beer) and starchy roots per capita derived from both local production and imports. All series 
were converted to index numbers with 1980 serving as the base year (1980=100).  
 
    In sum, Africa’s urban transition in the early postcolonial period was driven 
by a combination of secular mortality decline set in motion in the late colonial 
period, a postcolonial adjustment involving the Africanisation and expansion of 
employment opportunities in urban areas, and an early investment drive. It was 
sustained through the recessionary years of 1975-2000 by persistent 
demographic expansion. In other words, urbanisation without growth and 
exceptionally high urban growth rates in the late twentieth century are both 
explicable once Africa’s post-war political and population dynamics are taken 
into account. 
    As a test of this argument, I estimate the following models using ordinary 
least squares: 
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(3)                                                                         
                                                                   
                                                
 
(4)                                                                           
                                                                   
                                                
 
 In equation (3) the dependent variable is the compound average annual rate of 
urbanisation in country i; in equation (4) the dependent variable is the 
compound average annual rate of urban population growth. In both equations 
the key independent variables include the average annual rate of change in the 
crude death rate of country i, the crude birth rate at the beginning of each 
period (to control for variations in fertility and hence the pace of overall 
population growth), the average annual rate of per capita income growth, and 
the sectoral composition of output, measured as the average percentage of 
agriculture value-added in GDP over the relevant period.10  
    According to the theory outlined above, changes in crude death rates are 
expected to be negatively correlated with rates of urbanisation and urban 
growth, changes in in GDP per capita  should show a positive sign and 
agriculture as a percentage of GDP should be negatively correlated (as a result 
of labour being retained in the rural sector). The model also incorporates a 
dummy variable for sub-Saharan African countries (SSA dummy) to determine 
whether or not countries in the region share some unobserved characteristics 
                                                          
10 In most countries estimates of agricultural output as a percentage of value-added are not 
available for all years. I therefore used the average of all available estimates for each country 
and period. This may result in some bias by under or over-estimating the average due to 
missing data points. Given that this indicator of the structural output of an economy tends to 
change relatively slowly this bias should be limited from a statistical standpoint.  
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that account for persistent urbanisation and urban growth in the absence of 
economic growth.  
    These models are estimated with two samples. The first is an unbalanced 
pooled panel dataset with 347 observations from 146 countries for which all 
necessary data for at least one period is available. Descriptive statistics and a 
correlation matrix of explanatory variables are presented in Appendix B. There 
are 15-year intervals in the dataset that roughly correspond to global economic 
trends (1960-1975, 1975-1990 and 1990-2005) in order to limit the influence of 
short-term fluctuations in economic and demographic conditions and a sample 
of countries. The second sample is also an unbalanced pooled panel consisting 
of observations from 40 countries in sub-Saharan Africa for which all necessary 
data for at least one period are available. The models are estimated with both 
samples.  
     This arrangement also permits the inclusion of two more control variables: 
interactive regional dummies to determine whether there was a significant 
post-colonial adjustment effect associated with the ‘Africanisation’ of 
employment in the public and private sectors (see Jamal and Weeks 1988; Fay 
and Opal 2000). These are SSA*(1960/75) covering the 1960-75 period and 
SSA*(1975/90) covering the 1975-90 period. For the African sample the 
SSA*(1960/75) and SSA*(1975/90) dummy variables serve simply as period 
dummy variables. Finally, as per convention, the initial level of urbanisation in 
each period is controlled for given that the rate of urbanisation in a country 
naturally declines as the proportion of the population living in urban areas 
increases. The results are presented in Table 2.5. 
    As anticipated, there is a negative and statistically significant correlation 
between changes in crude death rates and rates of both urbanisation and urban 
growth across all specifications and both samples. Growth in GDP per capita is 
positively and statistically significantly correlated at the 1% level with rates of 
urban population change in the global sample. However, the correlation 
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between growth and urbanisation is not significant in the Africa-only sample, 
while the correlation between growth and urban population growth remains 
positive and significant at the 5% level. 
 
Table 2.5 Determinants of urbanisation and urban growth rates: pooled OLS estimates 
    All countries  Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Urbanisation 
rate 
Urban 
growth rate 
 Urbanisation 
rate 
Urban 
growth rate 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
∆Crude death rate -.157*** 
(.043) 
-.345*** 
(.051) 
 -.268*** 
(.082) 
-.271*** 
(.089) 
Crude birth rate t1 .008 
(.008) 
.078*** 
(.009) 
 -.120*** 
(.036) 
-.023 
(.039) 
∆ GDP per capita .145*** 
(.024) 
.143*** 
(.028) 
 .073 
(.051) 
.125** 
(.055) 
Agriculture  -.007 
(.005) 
-.025*** 
(.007) 
 -.011 
(.011) 
-.017 
(.012) 
SSA dummy .336 
(.221) 
.740*** 
(.259) 
   
SSA*(1960/75) 1.570*** 
(.273) 
1.406*** 
(.320) 
 .949** 
(.384) 
1.010** 
(.416) 
SSA*(1975/90) .634** 
(.254) 
.629** 
(.297) 
 .531 
(.340) 
.734** 
(.369) 
Urbanisation t1 -.335*** 
(.051) 
-.280*** 
(.060) 
 -.843*** 
(.131) 
-.679*** 
(.142) 
Constant 2.632 
(.516) 
1.838*** 
(.605) 
 11.83*** 
(1.971) 
8.982*** 
(2.137) 
R-squared .575 .731  .586 .546 
Observations 347 347  97 97 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are 
indicated by ***, **, * respectively. Population statistics and vital rates are from the United 
Nations Population division database, accessed January 2014. Crude death and birth rates 
are per 1000. Urbanisation estimates were square-root transformed to normalise the sample 
distribution. GDP per capita and agriculture value-added as a percentage of GDP are from 
the World Bank World Development Indicators database, accessed January 2014. GDP per 
capita is measured in constant 2005 US$. 
 
    Agriculture as a percentage of GDP shows a consistently negative sign, as 
expected, but is only statistically significant in column 2. The SSA dummy is 
positive in columns 1 and 2, but only significant in column 2. This suggests that 
there are some unobserved characteristics of countries in the region which are 
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influencing the pace of urban population change. More research is clearly 
required to account for this.  
    The period interaction dummys are both positive and significant in the global 
sample. In the Africa-only sample the SSA*(1960/75) is positive and significant 
in both models, while the SSA*(1975/90) is only significant in the second model 
(column 4). Nevertheless, the fact that the SSA*(1960/75) coefficient is larger in 
magnitude and significance than that of the SSA*(1975/90) dummy in all models 
provides support for the argument that there was a significant post-colonial 
adjustment effect that abated with time, albeit by no means conclusively.  
    Overall, these results show a strong correlation between mortality decline 
and urban population change and a positive but less robust association between 
economic growth and urban population change, which is consistent with the 
arguments outline above. However, the design of these models precludes 
definitive statements about causation. It is possible, for example, that 
urbanisation and urban population growth accelerate mortality decline, or that 
there are unobserved factors driving both results. 
    A second test examining the determinants of changes in levels of urbanisation 
and urban population size serves as a robustness check. In this case, the model 
is designed to test whether or not lagged values of the independent variables of 
interest add predictive power to a model that includes lagged values of the 
dependent variables as independent variables.11 I examine whether or not 
changes in crude death rates and GDP growth rates between t1 and t2 help to 
predict levels of urbanisation and urban population size at time t2 when levels 
of urbanisation and urban population size at time t1 are controlled for. The 
functional form of the models can be expressed by the following equations: 
 
                                                          
11 This approach follows the logic (although not the exact form) of a ‘Granger causality test’ (see 
Granger 1969 and Bloom, Canning and Fink 2008). A variable X can be said to ‘Granger-cause’ Y 
if X at time t-1 (Xt-1) explains variation in Y at time t (Yt) when Y at time t-1 (Yt-1) is included as 
a control variable on the right hand side of the equation. 
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(5) 
                 
                                                   
                                                      
                   
                                           
(6) 
                     
                                                   
                                                      
                   
                                                  
 
The data are divided into the same three 15-year periods as in the previous 
models. Given that past levels of urbanisation and urban population size 
explain over 90% of variation in contemporary levels, our independent 
variables of interest must be robustly correlated with our dependent variables 
to exhibit statistical significance. Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix 
of explanatory variables are presented in Appendix B. The results of this test are 
presented in Table 2.6. 
    Again, the findings are consistent with the arguments presented above: 
changes in crude death rates between the beginning and end of each 15-year 
period are negatively and significantly correlated with levels of urbanisation 
and urban population size at the end of each period. In this case reverse 
causality cannot be driving the result; a country’s level of urbanisation at time 
t2 cannot have influenced mortality decline between t1 and t2. Nevertheless, 
omitted variables could still be driving the results.12 
                                                          
12 However, recent analysis by Bandyopadhyay and Green (2013) use different samples and 
estimation strategies, including an instrumental variables approach and arrive at the same 
conclusion: mortality decline is robustly and causally associated with urbanisation. 
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    As in the previous model, GDP growth shows a consistently positive sign 
and is statistically significant in the global sample. In the Africa-only sample it 
is not significantly correlated with urbanisation and weakly correlated with 
urban population size. Agriculture is negatively and significantly correlated 
with levels of urbanisation in both samples, but uncorrelated with urban 
population size. Once again the dummy variable for sub-Saharan African 
countries is positively and significantly correlated with urban population size, 
suggesting there are some significant unobserved factors influencing urban 
population growth. And once again the period dummy variables indicate that 
there were temporally specific influences resulting in more rapid changes in the 
size of urban populations in the early independence period, and that these 
appear to have diminished with time, which is consistent with the view that 
there was a postcolonial adjustment effect.  
    Overall, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that mortality decline 
is a significant determinant of both absolute and relative changes in urban 
population size. Although changes in GDP per capita appear to be less 
consistently and significantly correlated with urbanisation and urban growth in 
African countries this does not mean that fluctuations in economic 
opportunities do not significantly affect migration trends. Indeed, GDP 
estimates in Africa are notoriously poor (Jerven 2013), so estimates of annual 
change need to be treated with caution. Moreover, these official statistics do not 
capture economic activity in the informal sector, which by some estimates 
constitutes over 70% of economic activity in the regions (ILO 2009). 
Consequently it is impossible from these regression models to make any 
definitive statement about the contribution of economically motivated rural-
urban migration in driving urbanisation. The only firm conclusion is that 
mortality decline matters, and that rates of urbanisation and urban population 
growth in sub-Saharan Africa were particularly fast between 1960 and 1990 
relative to trends in other regions, and relative to the post-1990 period in Africa. 
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Table 2.6 Determinants of changes in levels of urbanisation and urban population size: 
 pooled OLS estimates 
 All countries  Sub-Saharan Africa 
 Urbanisationt2 
Urban 
population t2 
 
Urbanisationt2 
Urban 
population t2 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
∆Crude death rate -.050*** 
(.017) 
-.051*** 
(.008) 
 -.095*** 
(.030) 
-.037*** 
(.014) 
Crude birth rate t1 .012*** 
(.003) 
.013*** 
(.001) 
 -.034** 
(.013) 
.005 
(.006) 
∆GDP per capita .055*** 
(.009) 
.026*** 
(.004) 
 .023 
(.019) 
.017* 
(.009) 
Agriculture -.007*** 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.001) 
 -.007* 
(.004) 
.000 
(.002) 
SSA dummy .115 
(.085) 
.113*** 
(.040) 
   
SSA*(1960/75) .302*** 
(.105) 
.254*** 
(.049) 
 .297** 
(.140) 
.180*** 
(.064) 
SSA*(1975/90) .183* 
(.097) 
.118*** 
(.046) 
 .227* 
(.124) 
.090 
(.059) 
Urbanisationt1 .943*** 
(.020) 
  .884*** 
(.048) 
 
Ln urban pop t1  .993*** 
(.005) 
  .926*** 
(.019) 
R-squared .954 .992  .906 .976 
Observations 347 347  97 97 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are 
indicated by ***, **, * respectively. See notes for Table 2.5 for data sources.  
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Development economists and policy makers have generally interpreted the 
process of urbanisation through the lens of a dual-economy model of 
development in which cities expand due to rural-urban migration driven by 
expectations of employment in urban areas. When it became clear that 
urbanisation and urban population growth was outpacing formal sector job 
creation in urban areas, the policy response was to discourage migration (see 
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Chapter 3). In other words, Africa’s urban transition was seen as abnormal and 
undesirable from a developmental standpoint. 
    In this chapter I have argued and provided evidence that urbanisation and 
urban growth are also intrinsically associated with demographic processes that 
can become de-linked from economic ones. Improvements in disease control 
and food security can lead to a reduction in mortality rates, which in itself may 
be sufficient to drive both urbanisation and urban growth. Although such 
improvements often accompany the expansion and diversification of an 
economy’s output (i.e. economic development), these processes are not 
intrinsically linked.  
    In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, colonialism, trade and aid brought key 
technological and institutional innovations that facilitated disease control and 
food security, which in turn stimulated a secular decline in mortality rates and a 
population boom. This in turn set in motion rapid urban population growth 
and a steady rise in the proportion of the regional population living in urban 
areas. In some extreme cases, such as Zambia, a contraction in food supplies 
and resurgence of infectious diseases saw urbanisation temporarily reverse 
course. But even Zambia’s urban population continued to grow in absolute 
terms.  
    This latter observation is important for policymakers. In many respects, the 
challenges of urban expansion are more directly related to the absolute number 
of people living in cities rather than the proportion of the national population 
living in cities. And the evidence suggests that urban natural increase 
contributes more to urban population growth than migration. Moreover, 
migration restriction policies have generally failed to yield significant 
reductions in urban population growth. 
    For governments interested in alleviating demographic pressure in urban 
areas, a more ration policy option is one targeted at encouraging fertility decline 
in order to reduce population growth rates. While fertility decline is a natural 
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consequence of urbanisation, interventions such as voluntary family planning 
initiatives may serve to accelerate the process and ease the strains associated 
with rapid urban population growth in the region. 
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Appendix A 
Data description and sources 
 
Variable Description Source 
Urbanisation (%) 
(Tables 2.3, 2.5, 2.6) 
Percentage of national 
population residing in 
urban areas 
United Nations Population Division, World 
Population Prospects: the 2009 Revision 
(2010) 
Urban population 
(Tables 2.3, 2.5, 2.6) 
Log of the absolute size of a 
country’s urban population 
in 1000’s 
United Nations Population Division, World 
Population Prospects: the 2009 Revision 
(2010) 
Ln national population 
(Tables 2.3) 
Log of the absolute size of a 
country’s population in 
1000’s 
United Nations Population Division, World 
Population Prospects: the 2009 Revision 
(2010) 
World population 1000-
2000 AD (Fig.2.5) 
Population in millions 
Maddison, Angus (2009) Historical statistics: 
World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 
1-2003 AD (March 2009). Available online at: 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/  
GDP per capita 1000-
2000 AD (Fig. 2.5) 
Real GDP per capita in 1990 
International Geary-
Khamis dollars 
Maddison, Angus (2009) Historical statistics: 
World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 
1-2003 AD (March 2009). Available online at: 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/  
Historical urbanisation 
estimates (Fig. 2.5, 2.7) 
Percentage of world 
population residing in 
urban areas 
Grauman, John V. (1977) ‘Orders of 
magnitude of the world’s urban population in 
history’, Population Bulletin of the United 
Nations No.8 -1976, New York: United 
Nations. 
Ln Coastline (km) 
Log of kilometres of 
coastline 
CIA World Factbook (various years) 
Ln Waterways (km) 
Log of navigable 
waterways 
CIA World Factbook (various years) 
Soil potential 
Percentage of land area 
with soil very or 
moderately suitable for 6 
key rainfed crops 
Gallup, John L. and Jeffrey D. Sachs, with 
Andrew Mellinger,"Geography and Economic 
Development" (CID Working PaperNo. 1, 
March 1999). Available at: 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.
html 
Colonial investment, 
1870-1936 
(Fig. 2.8, 2.9) 
Sum of publically listed 
capital invested in African 
colonial territories between 
1870 and 1936, calculated in 
pounds sterling  
Frankel, S. Herbert (1969) Capital Investment 
in Africa: Its Course and Effects, New York: 
Howard Fertig 
Indirect rule 
(Table 2.3) 
Percentage of legal cases 
adjudicated by ‘traditional’ 
authorities in British 
colonies, 1955 
Lange, Matthew K. (2004) 'British Colonial 
Legacies and Political Development', World 
Development, Vol. 32, No. 6: 905-922 
Col. Civ. Serv. 
(Table 2.3) 
Colonial civil servants per 
capita in African territories 
c. 1936 
Richens, Peter (2009) 'The Economic Legacies 
of the 'Thin White Line': Indirect Rule and the 
Comparative Development of Sub-Saharan 
Africa', Economic History Working Paper No. 
131, London School of Economics & Political 
Science. 
IMR 1960 
(Table 2.3) 
Infant mortality rate in 1960 
United Nations Population Division, World 
Population Prospects: the 2008 Revision 
(2009) 
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Calories per capita 
(Table 2.3) 
Average available calories 
per capita per day in 1960 
Food and Agricultural organization, available 
at http://faostat.fao.org 
Physicians per 1000 
(Table 2.3) 
Physicians per 1000 
population around 1960. 
Missing values were 
replaced by nearest 
available year 
World Bank World Development Indicators 
online, accessed June 2011. Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators 
∆IMR 1960-1975 
(Table 2.3) 
Average annual rate of 
change in infant mortality 
rate between 1960 and 1975 
Author calculations based on data from 
United Nations Population Division, World 
Population Prospects: the 2008 Revision 
(2009) 
Food supply (Fig. 2.10) 
Sum of domestically 
produced and imported 
cereals (excluding beer) and 
starchy roots in tonnes 
Food and Agricultural organization, 
FAOSTAT database. Available at 
http://faostat.fao.org 
Food supply (Fig.2. 11) 
Available tonnes per capita 
of cereals and starchy roots 
Food and Agricultural organization, 
FAOSTAT database. Available at 
http://faostat.fao.org 
Crude death rate (Fig.2. 
10, 2.11, Table 2.5, 2.6) 
Deaths per 1000 population 
World Bank World Development Indicators 
online, January 2014. 
Crude birth rate (Table 
2.5 & 2.6) 
Births per 1000 population 
World Bank World Development Indicators 
online, January 2014. 
GDP per capita 
(Table 2.5 & 2.6)  
Natural log of GDP per 
capita in constant 2005 US$ 
World Bank World Development Indicators 
online, January 2014. 
Agriculture (% of GDP) 
Average of agriculture 
value-added as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Calculated for three 15-year 
periods (1960-1975, 1975-
1990, 1990-2005). Average 
taken of all available 
country-year estimates.  
World Bank World Development Indicators 
online, accessed June 2011. Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators 
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Appendix B 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrices 
 
 
Table B1 Descriptive statistics for Table 2.2 
 
 
Table B2 Descriptive statistics for Tables 2.5 and 2.6 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ln Coastline (km) 126 5.88 3.21 .00 12.22 
Ln Waterways (km) 126 5.21 3.69 .00 11.73 
Soil potential 126 33.24 9.84 5.23 61.84 
Crude death rate, 1960 126 17.64 7.33 5.70 36.45 
Ln GDP per capita, 1960 126 7.51 .985 5.97 10.40 
Ln national pop 126 15.50 1.61 10.71 20.32 
Square root of urbanisation (%), 1960 126 5.34 2.09 1.41 9.62 
Ln urban population, 1960 126 14.06 1.93 9.52 18.66 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
∆Crude death rate 347 -1.18 1.67 -8.30 5.65 
Crude birth rate t1 347 32.52 13.34 .00 55.95 
∆ GDP per capita 347 1.66 2.47 -9 17 
Agriculture  347 19.75 15.36 .12 69.60 
SSA dummy 347 .28 .449 0 1 
Urbanisationt1 347 6.35 1.99 1.41 10.00 
Urbanisationt2 347 6.88 1.83 1.79 10.00 
Urbanisation rate 347 1.33 1.57 -1.96 8.97 
Urban growth rate 347 3.13 2.31 -1.66 11.93 
Ln urban population t1 347 14.49 2.09 9.58 19.56 
Ln urban population t2 347 14.96 2.01 9.65 20.08 
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Table B3 Correlation matrix for Table 2.2 
 
Ln 
Coastline 
(km) 
Ln 
Waterways 
(km) 
Soil 
potential 
Crude death 
rate, 1960 
Ln GDP 
per capita, 
1960 
Ln 
national 
pop 
Ln Coastline (km) 1 
     Ln Waterways (km) .213 1 
    Soil potential -0.07 0.00 1 
   Crude death rate, 1960 -.350 -0.14 -0.01 1 
  Ln GDP per capita, 1960 .413 0.13 -0.12 -.688 1 
 Ln national pop .354 .547 0.10 -0.15 -0.02 1 
        
Table B4 Correlation matrix for Tables 2.5 and 2.6 
 
∆Crude 
death 
rate 
Crude 
birth rate 
t1 
∆ GDP per 
capita 
Agricultur
e 
SSA 
dummy 
Urbanisati
ont1 
Ln urban 
pop t1 
∆Crude death rate 1 
     
 
Crude birth rate t1 -0.497 1 
    
 
∆ GDP per capita 0.004 -0.215 1 
   
 
Agriculture  -0.277 0.661 -0.196 1 
  
 
SSA dummy -0.017 0.625 -0.236 0.532 1 
 
 
Urbanisationt1 0.288 -0.692 0.066 -0.774 -0.567 1  
Ln urban pop t1 0.062 -0.304 0.067 -0.264 -0.281 0.41 1 
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Chapter Three 
 
The political economy of slums in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
Over 800 million people in Africa, Asia and Latin America live in 
slums. Why? I argue that slums are a result of ‘disjointed 
modernization’ and show that roughly 70% of cross-country 
variation in slum incidence is explained by demographic, economic 
and institutional factors. I trace the origins of disjointed 
modernization in sub-Saharan Africa back to the colonial period and 
show that colonial era investments and institutions are reflected in 
contemporary cross-country variation in slum incidence. I argue that 
status quo interests and the rise of an anti-urbanisation bias in 
development discourse have inhibited investment and reform in the 
post-colonial era. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
According to UN-Habitat (2008) over 800 million people in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America live in slums—i.e. urban areas characterised by some 
combination of tenuous dwelling structures, overcrowding and lack of access to 
adequate water and sanitation facilities. Improving the lives of slum dwellers is 
one of the most pressing development challenges of the 21st century. United 
Nations projections suggest that all of the world’s population growth in the 
next 50 years will be absorbed by towns and cities in developing regions and 
World Bank research has shown that urban poverty is growing even as rural 
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poverty has begun to decline (UN 2012; Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula 2007). 
Despite these trends, surprisingly little systematic comparative research has 
been devoted to understanding the dynamics of urban poverty and 
development in recent decades. 
    The “challenge of slums” is particularly acute in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Although the region contains just 13% of the urban population of developing 
regions it hosts 25% of the slum population of developing regions according to 
UN-Habitat estimates (2008). Over 60% of sub-Saharan Africa’s urban 
population lives in slum conditions; the highest level of ‘slum incidence’ of any 
major world region and significantly higher than the developing region average 
of 32.7% (see Table 3.1).  
   This chapter provides a systematic analysis of the slums, drawing together a 
range of quantitative and qualitative evidence to account for the emergence and 
persistence of slums. In contrast to much of the literature on the topic, which 
portrays slums as either a symptom of modernization or a consequence of 
market failure, I highlight the historical and political dynamics that have 
resulted in differential urban development trajectories across countries within 
Africa and the developing world more generally. 
    I begin by constructing an empirical model of slum incidence to test the 
‘disjointed modernization’ hypothesis implied by the existing literature. Using 
ordinary least squares regression analysis I show that about 70% of 
contemporary cross-country variation in slum incidence is accounted for by 
variations in urban population growth rates, economic conditions and 
institutional quality, as predicted by this hypothesis. However, I argue that 
identifying the contemporary correlates of slum incidence does not amount to a 
convincing causal explanation for the scale and diversity of the phenomenon. 
For that we must identify the origins of divergence in urban economic and 
institutional development across countries.  
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Table 3.1 Slum incidence by major world region  
 Slum population as % of urban population 
 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
  Developing Regions 46.1 42.8 39.3 35.7 32.7 
  Northern Africa 34.4 28.3 20.3 13.4 13.3 
  Sub-Saharan Africa 70.0 67.6 65.0 63.0 61.7 
  Latin America & the Caribbean 33.7 31.5 29.2 25.5 23.5 
  Eastern Asia 43.7 40.6 37.4 33.0 28.2 
  Southern Asia 57.2 51.6 45.8 40.0 35.0 
  South-eastern Asia 49.5 44.8 39.6 34.2 31.0 
  Western Asia 22.5 21.6 20.6 25.8 24.6 
Source: UN-Habitat (2008) 
 
To that end, I trace the roots of contemporary variation in slum incidence in 
sub-Saharan Africa back to the colonial era, which represents a critical juncture 
in the history of urban development in the region. Generally speaking, colonial 
investments in urban infrastructure, housing and economic diversification were 
limited, and the systems of urban governance that were established were highly 
centralized and ad hoc. Towns and cities were essentially designed to facilitate 
the extraction of primary commodities and protect the interests and lifestyles of 
a European minority. However, urban investment and institutional 
development varied across Africa depending upon the depth of political and 
economic interests at play. I show that this variation in colonial investment and 
institutional development is correlated with contemporary variation in slum 
incidence.  
    Finally, I turn my attention to the mechanisms of path dependency that have 
served to perpetuate colonial era patterns of urban development. The 
proliferation of slum settlements in sub-Saharan Africa is de facto evidence of 
persistent government failure to invest in urban development and cultivate 
effective institutions for urban management. Understanding this failure is the 
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key to developing a genuinely causal explanation of the slum phenomenon in 
Africa. 
    I argue that the ad hoc governance arrangements and infrastructure 
deficiencies bequeathed by colonial administrations created complex 
coordination problems for postcolonial governments, but also generated 
opportunities for postcolonial political and economic entrepreneurs to cultivate 
instrumental patron-client networks and exploit rent-seeking opportunities. As 
a result, a constellation of ‘status-quo’ interest groups have emerged in the 
region. Put simply, urban underdevelopment has proven politically and 
economically beneficial to a wide range of actors in African cities. Moreover, I 
argue that the emergence of status quo interests coincided with the rise of an 
anti-urbanisation bias in international development discourse at a time when 
countries in Africa were experiencing historically unprecedented rates of urban 
population growth. This contributed to a contraction of urban infrastructure 
investment and the adoption of misguided policies designed to restrict or 
discourage rural-urban migration.  
    The proliferation of slums across the developing world can be understood as 
a consequence of ‘disjointed modernization’. However, the scale of the 
phenomenon should also be seen as symptomatic of government failure to 
proactively manage urban population expansion. There is little doubt that rapid 
urban population growth in developing regions—and Africa in particular—
places enormous strain on government resources and capacities. However, 
more could surely be done to improve the lives of the burgeoning urban 
populations in developing regions, but only where the interests and ideas of 
politicians and planners support a proactive urban development agenda.  
    The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section 
reviews the history of the term ‘slum’ and discusses the definition and 
measurement of the slums for empirical purposes. Section 3 reviews the 
existing literature on the emergence and persistence of slums. Section 4 presents 
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and tests an empirical model of slum incidence based on the ‘disjointed 
modernization’ hypothesis implied by the literature. Section 5 examines the 
influence of colonial patterns of investment and institutional development on 
urban development in Africa and demonstrates empirically that that these 
patterns are correlated with contemporary variation in slum incidence in the 
region. Section 6 introduces a stylized political economy model of urban 
development designed to elucidate the specific mechanisms of path 
dependency that have served to perpetuate these early patterns of urban 
development and draws on qualitative evidence to demonstrate their salience. 
Section 7 concludes with a brief discussion of the policy implications of the 
analysis presented. 
 
3.2 Defining and measuring the ‘challenge of slums’ 
The term ‘slum’ can be traced back to the 19th when it emerged as a descriptor 
for overcrowded, squalid inner-city tenements housing the poor working 
classes of industrializing cities in Europe and North America (Gilbert 2007, 
Ward 1976).  It was subsequently applied to the sprawling unplanned 
settlements that arose in the mid-20th century on the outskirts of rapidly 
growing cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America, despite the very different 
spatial and physical characteristics of these settlements. New terms were also 
introduced by scholars and governments to describe these areas such as 
shantytowns, informal settlements, squatter settlements, unplanned 
settlements, autonomous urban settlements and irregular settlements.    
    Recognizing the diversity of settlements classified as slums, sociologists in 
the 20th century worked to provide more accurate settlement typologies by 
examining the unique social characteristics of diverse low-income urban 
communities. For example, in a widely cited article, Stokes (1962) distinguished 
between ‘slums of hope’ and ‘slums of despair,’ with the former inhabited by 
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ambitious and optimistic individuals capable of improving their circumstances 
and the latter inhabited by the hopeless and destitute with no prospect of 
improvement. Similarly, drawing on in his research in Chile, Portes (1971) 
identified four types of slum settlements categorized according to the origins of 
the settlement (i.e. popular initiative versus government initiative) and 
residents’ perceptions of its permanence (i.e. temporary versus permanent). The 
list of slum typologies based on sociological research has grown ever longer 
since, taking into account location, size, age, etc.13 According to Gilbert (2007), 
‘The only common element over time has been that “slums” have always been 
perceived to be undesirable places in which to live’ (702). 
    This last definition, which is premised on a normative judgment, is an 
essentially socio-political as opposed to scientific definition of the phenomenon. 
The fact that the term is inherently normative in origin has led some to question 
its analytical value (Ward 1976; Gilbert 2007), and the recent resurrection of the 
term by UN-Habitat in its global ‘Cities Without Slums’ campaign has raised 
concerns that its use could result in a reversion to the stigmatization of urban 
poverty that was so common and frequently destructive in the past (Gilbert 
2007).  
    However, the term does have analytical value in exactly the same way that 
words such as ‘poverty’ and ‘inequality’ do: it provides a unified descriptor for 
a heterogeneous phenomenon with (assumed) common underlying causes. 
While efforts to deconstruct the concept of slums and create more nuanced 
typologies of different kinds of low-income settlements based on their social 
dynamics has its merits, it can also lead to a situation in which the trees obscure 
the forest – i.e. the broader structures and processes at play in the production of 
the phenomenon. If one accepts the normative basis of the concept of the slum, 
it becomes possible to investigate it empirically. As with measures of poverty 
                                                          
13
 See UN-Habitat (2003), Chapter 5. 
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and relative deprivation, normative criteria can be translated into observable 
indicators.  
    In the case of slums, UN-Habitat has done this with the introduction of a 
‘slum population index’, which was developed by UN-Habitat’s Global Urban 
Observatory to assist in monitoring Target 11 of the Millennium Development 
Goals: “By 2020 to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at 
least 100 million slum dwellers”. A slum household is defined by UN-Habitat 
as lacking one or more of the following: a durable structure, access to safe 
water, access to sanitation facilities and sufficient living area. In other words, a 
‘slum’ household exhibits some form of shelter deprivation. In Africa, Asia and 
Latin America, such conditions are sometimes found in inner-city areas, but are 
more commonly manifest in the sprawling informal settlements that run in and 
around the more built-up central districts of towns and cities. 
    The slum population index was compiled from a combination of data sources 
including household surveys (primarily DHS and MICS) and census data.  
While the validity of the data at the individual country level may be subject to 
criticisms of measurement error, the index remains useful in the context of this 
study assuming that the relative orders of magnitude between countries are 
reasonably consistent. Although UN-Habitat has published slum population 
estimates for 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2007 and 2009 they are not comparable. 
Prior to 2005 many country estimates relied on just two shelter components as 
opposed to the four used to produce the 2005 estimates, and the definition of 
adequate sanitation changed for the 2005 estimates. Moreover, the 2005 series 
offers the greatest country coverage by far, particularly for countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. In this chapter I therefore only employ the 2005 series for 
empirical purposes. 
    Figure 3.1 shows slum incidence rates—i.e. the percentage of a nation’s urban 
population living in slums as defined by UN-Habitat—for the 38 countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa for which data are available. There is clearly wide variation 
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in the region, from a high of 97% in Sierra Leone to a low of approximately 18% 
in Zimbabwe.  
 
Figure 3.1 Slum incidence in 38 sub-Saharan African countries, 2005 
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3.3 Theories of slums: modernization and market failure 
Slums have traditionally been portrayed as a transitional phenomenon 
associated with modernization—a natural by-product of the (assumed) 
complementary processes of industrialization and urbaniation. For example, 
Frankenhoff (1967) suggested that ‘slums necessarily belong to the process of 
economic growth in a developing country’ by acting as ‘the staging area for the 
migrating poor’ as they work to integrate themselves into the economic life of 
cities in expanding economies (27-28). Similarly, John Turner (1969), an 
influential pioneer of the study of slums and squatter settlements, argued that 
they are ‘both the product of and the vehicle for activities which are essential in 
the process of modernization’ (509). According to this perspective, poor rural 
migrants initially cannot afford to build, buy or rent decent housing and opt 
instead for cheap, substandard unites close to employment opportunities. As 
they become integrated into the urban economy and their incomes rise, these 
migrants eventually enter the formal housing market or invest in upgrading 
their existing dwellings, thereby ameliorating slum conditions. In other words, 
modernization theory portrays slums as a natural and temporary manifestation 
of a market failure arising from the dynamics of structural change in labour 
markets. 
    This teleological theory is premised on several flawed assumptions. First, it 
assumes that slum settlements grow to accommodate labour migrants, but the 
link between urban population growth and urban economic growth is tenuous, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, which experienced two decades of 
“urbanization without growth” (Fay and Opal 2000; Fox 2012). Second, it 
assumes that economic growth will trickle down to those living in slums, 
allowing them to improve their lot. This is questionable given abundant 
research indicating low degrees of intergenerational socio-economic mobility 
for households living in slum settlements (see Buckley and Kalarickal 2005). 
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Third, it assumes that slums provide cheap housing for cheap labour, but the 
costs of living vary widely in slums, with residents often paying a premium for 
both units and services (see Gulyani and Talukdar 2008). The process of 
modernization, in other words, seems to have gone awry in cities across the 
developing world and Africa in particular.  
    A variety of theories have been advanced to explain this deviation from the 
assumed path of modernization. Broadly speaking, these theories portray the 
persistence of slums as a manifestation of land and housing market failures 
arising from demographic, economic or institutional factors.  
    Perhaps the most popular explanation for the growth of slums is rapid urban 
population growth, especially in Africa. For example, Obudho and Mhlanga 
(1988) claimed that ‘the development of slum and squatter settlements in Africa 
is a direct manifestation of the high rate of urbanization’ (3), while Malpezzi 
and Sa-Aadu (1996) argued that ‘the rate of African urbanization is the raison 
d’etre for squatter settlements’ (151) in the region. Intuitive as this may be, and 
surely an important conditioning factor in many cases, rapid urban growth is 
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the formation of slums. Some 
brief examples serve to illustrate the point.  
    Between 1960 and 1990, the population of Accra, Ghana grew from 393,000 
inhabitants to 1.2 million. Today, approximately 58% of Accra’s population 
lives in unplanned settlements (UN-Habitat 2009). Over the same period, 
Phoenix, Arizona grew from 558,000 inhabitants to 2.02 million–adding more 
people at a faster rate than Accra–without the emergence of slum conditions. 
Conversely, there is an extensive literature on the consequences of ‘de-
industrialization’ in North American and European cities. The dissolution or 
relocation of industrial enterprises which had previously been important 
employers in a particular city leads to rising unemployment, population decline 
(as people move away), and the deterioration of infrastructure and housing 
stock due to lower incomes and reduced local government revenues for 
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maintenance. In some cases this has resulted in ‘slum’ conditions. In other 
words, slums can also emerge in a context of urban population contraction 
(UN-Habitat 2003). 
    This is an important point to note (or reiterate) considering the popularity of 
policies designed to slow the pace of urbanisation as a means of arresting slum 
growth. Somewhat ironically, urban deprivation has often been used to justify 
expenditures on rural development, an issue I will return to in Section 5 below. 
It is also an important point from an analytical perspective. If rapid population 
growth is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for slum formation and 
growth, we need to look elsewhere for underlying causes.  
    Generally speaking, demographic explanations are accompanied by an 
economic one:  slums emerge and persist due to urban poverty. As Turner 
(1969) noted, slums will inevitably continue to exist ‘as long as the poor remain 
poor’ (526). The logic of this argument is straightforward. Income determines 
‘effective demand’ (Mosha 1988)—i.e. the quality of dwelling that individuals 
and households can afford to build, buy or rent. Where incomes are low, 
housing quality will be poor due to a) the limited resources available to owner-
occupiers for building, upgrading and maintenance and b) the absence of 
incentives for developers to invest in providing rental housing that meets 
normative international standards. In other words, urban poverty has long been 
cited as a sufficient condition for both the emergence and persistence of slums. 
    This is a more compelling argument than a purely demographic one. Slum 
conditions are fundamentally a manifestation of underinvestment in housing 
and infrastructure stock. While demography drives demand, socioeconomic 
conditions are clearly a critical determinant of the resources available to 
generate the supply of serviced housing units.  However, resources constraints 
are not the sole determinant of investment; institutions also matter. 
    Indeed, institutional explanations of urban underdevelopment, which have a 
long pedigree, are currently in vogue. For decades, scholars have argued that 
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urban planning regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America, which were 
generally based on planning norms in Europe and North America, have proven 
ill-suited to the socioeconomic realities of rapid urbanisation in these regions 
(Turner 1969; Turner 1976; King 1980; Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989; Stren and 
Halfani 2001). For example, Collier and Venables (2013) argue that the 
introduction of the British Town and Country Planning act of 1947 in British 
colonies resulted in unrealistic building standards out of step with local income 
levels, and that these remained in place after independence because “the new 
African political elite wanted to join modernity not to dilute it” (5). Similarly, 
poorly defined and enforced property rights can create inefficient friction in 
land and housing markets and discourage private investment (see Turner 1969; 
Turner 1976; de Soto 2000; UN-Habitat 2003; World Bank 2009).  Even the urban 
poor show an ability to invest in incremental upgrading when faced with the 
right incentives (see Field 2005).  
    Institutional issues are also cited as a factor inhibiting public investment. The 
illegality of settlements that consist of structures which violate planning 
regulations or contravene property rights often discourages public investments 
in infrastructure, either because such settlements are ineligible for investment, 
or because public authorities fear that public investment will constitute tacit 
recognition of legitimate occupancy rights and encourage further illegal 
settlement (UNCHS 1982; UN-Habitat 2003; World Bank 2009). 
    Each of these arguments points to a specific dynamic of market failure 
associated with the emergence and persistence of slums. Rapid urban 
population growth is essentially portrayed as a source of ‘excessive demand’; 
urban poverty results in ‘defective demand’ and constrains investment; and 
inappropriate institutional arrangements distort investment incentives. Put 
differently, slums can be understood as a manifestation of ‘disjointed 
modernization’ in which urban population growth outpaces urban economic 
and institutional development. 
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3.4 OLS analysis of the ‘disjointed modernization’ theory 
Quantitative empirical analysis of slum formation and growth is hampered by a 
severe dearth of reliable data, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Little effort 
and few resources have been devoted to urban data collection resulting in 
critical information gaps with regards to basic socioeconomic indicators such as 
income level and distribution, mortality and fertility rates, employment, local 
government capacity and integrity, etc. Nevertheless, the slum incidence 
estimates produced by UN-Habitat make it possible to conduct a rudimentary 
test of the disjointed modernization theory of slums outlined above.  
    Ideally we would exploit differences in slum incidence across countries and 
over time to identify the mechanisms that drive slum formation, growth and 
amelioration. However, as noted in section two, reliable time series estimates 
are not currently available for a significant cross section of African countries.  
    As a rough test of the disjointed modernization hypothesis I estimate the 
following equation using ordinary least squares: 
 
 
 
where Si is the proportion of a country’s urban population living in slum 
settlements in 2005. Ui is the compound average annual rate of urban 
population growth between 1990 and 2005. This variable is included to capture 
the effects of trends in demand growth. Ei is a vector of two economic variables: 
the log of average GDP per capita between 1990 and 2005 (a general measure of 
economic development) and the log of average product export diversity 
between 1995 and 2005 from UNCTAD, which serves as a proxy for urban 
economic conditions (see below). Ii represents a country’s average ‘rule of law’ 
score between 1996 and 2005, drawn from the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. This is a rough (and common) proxy for ‘institutional 
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quality’. It clearly does not capture important institutional nuances that are 
specific to urban governance, such as land tenure arrangements, zoning 
regulations or building codes. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to suppose a 
correlation between a government’s general ability to maintain the rule of law 
and its ability to plan and regulate urban settlements effectively. All of these 
variables are averaged over time to prevent the estimates from being biased by 
single year anomalies. They are also lagged to reduce the prospect of obtaining 
biased estimated due to endogeneity, an issue discussed in more detail below. 
    Finally, Ai is a dummy variable assigned a value of 1 for countries in sub-
Saharan Africa and a value of 0 for all other countries in the sample. This is 
included to assess the extent to which demographic, economic and institutional 
factors account for the exceptionally high average level of slum incidence 
observed in the region. Full details of the sources of the variables employed in 
this model can be found in Appendix A. Descriptive statistics and a correlation 
matrix of explanatory variables can be found in Appendix B. 
    The sample consists of 85 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America for 
which all relevant data are available.14 I use the largest possible sample in order 
to test the general hypotheses associated with the disjointed modernization 
hypothesis, which should apply to all countries, and to determine whether or 
not there is something unique about countries in sub-Saharan Africa that 
renders them more likely have large slums than counties in other regions. In 
other words, this design allows us to examine two axis of variation in slum 
incidence: between regions and between countries.      
    The ‘product export diversity’ variable is included to compensate for the fact 
that the (national) GDP per capita indicator does not provide information about 
the distribution of income or earning opportunities in the urban sector. It is 
possible for a country to have a relatively high GDP per capita but an 
                                                          
14 The sample falls to 83 in some specifications due to missing GDP estimates for Myanmar and 
Somalia. 
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underdeveloped urban sector (in terms of output, and level and distribution of 
income) if economic activity is concentrated in a capital intensive sector (e.g. oil 
economies such as Angola or Equatorial Guinea). The use of export diversity 
data to capture information about urban economic conditions is based on the 
logic that a robust urban economy with a broad income base is characterised by 
economic diversity and extensive trade. A country’s export diversity score is 
calculated by summing the number of product categories that comprise a 
country’s export profile in any given year. There are 216 categories in total. The 
average product diversity score in the whole sample is 146 with Brazil, Chinca, 
India and Thailand tied for the maximum with 251 each. For the 38 countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa the mean export diversity score is 110, with a minimum of 
19 in Guinea-Bissau and a maximum of 251 is South Africa.  
    While a country’s export profile does not fully capture the extent of 
specialisation and exchange in the urban sector, it is a reasonable proxy, and the 
best available given the dearth of urban level data available on income, 
inequality and poverty. To my knowledge, this is the first time this indicator 
has been interpreted and used in this way.  
    Given the forgoing discussion, a country’s rate of urban population growth is 
expected to be positively correlated with slum incidence, while GDP per capita, 
product export diversity and the quality of the rule of law are expected to be 
negatively correlated with slum incidence. Table 3.2 presents the results of the 
OLS model.  
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Table 3.2 Determinants of cross-country variation in slum incidence: OLS results 
 Dependent variable = slum incidence 2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Urban pop. growth, 1990-2005 4.93*** 
(1.53) 
  2.82* 
(1.28) 
2.63** 
(1.27) 
Avg. GDP per capita, 1990-2005  -11.44*** 
(1.93) 
 -7.60*** 
(2.02) 
-8.55*** 
(1.92) 
Export diversity, 1995-2005  -8.14*** 
(3.08) 
 -8.16*** 
(2.89) 
-9.06*** 
(2.85) 
Rule of law, 1996-2005   -17.93*** 
(3.37) 
-11.14*** 
(3.01) 
-11.35*** 
(3.2) 
AFRICA dummy 22.73*** 
(4.56) 
8.37* 
(4.36) 
20.73*** 
(3.99) 
5.83 
(4.05) 
 
R-squared .42 .62 .53 .69 .69 
Observations 85 83 85 83 83 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels are 
indicated by ***, **, * respectively. 
 
Columns 1-3 show that demographic, economic and institutional conditions are 
each significantly correlated with slum incidence (as anticipated), but that none 
of these factors alone accounts for sub-Saharan Africa’s unusually high levels of 
slum incidence. This is demonstrated by the positive and significant correlation 
between the AFRICA dummy variable and slum incidence in each of these 
specifications. However, in the full model (Column 4), which explains nearly 
70% of cross-country variation in slum incidence, all of the independent 
variables of interest remain significant while the AFRICA dummy is rendered 
insignificant. Finally, in column 5 the Africa dummy is dropped and yet the fit 
of the model, as well as the magnitudes and significance of the coefficients, 
remain stable. These results suggest that the high levels of slum incidence 
observed in countries in sub-Saharan Africa (relative to countries in other 
developing world regions) are largely accounted for by observable 
demographic, economic and institutional factors.  
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Table 3.3 Determinants of slum incidence within SSA: OLS results 
 Dependent variable = slum incidence 2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Urban pop. growth, 1990-2005 1.81 
(2.40) 
  1.54 
(1.90) 
Avg. GDP per capita, 1990-2005  -10.07*** 
(3.122) 
 -8.38*** 
(3.07) 
Export diversity, 1995-2005  -9.84** 
(4.13) 
 -8.48** 
(4.00) 
Rule of law, 1996-2005   -15.59*** 
(5.01) 
-11.59** 
(4.74) 
R-squared .016 .402 .212 .501 
Observations 38 37 38 37 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels are 
indicated by ***, **, * respectively. 
 
Table 3.3 presents the same specifications with only the 38 countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. The results are very similar, although in this case urban 
population growth is not a significant predictor. This may be due to universally 
high rates over the period covered (hence not too much variation to explain) 
and indicates that this may be one of the factors that has set Africa apart from 
other regions. 
    While these results are consistent with the disjointed modernization 
hypothesis, these simple OLS models do not provide a strong basis for causal 
inference for two reasons.  
    First, plausible arguments for endogeneity can be made despite the use of 
lagged independent variables. There is little reason to suspect that slum 
conditions result in higher urban population growth. If anything, slum 
conditions may discourage migration into settlements with poor service 
provision and hence reduce urban population growth (Feler and Henderson 
2011). However, economic conditions and institutions may be affected by 
conditions in urban areas. For example, countries with higher levels of slum 
incidence may experience slower growth due to the higher transaction costs 
and negative externalities associated with doing business in underserviced, 
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under-regulated settlements (see Lee and Anas 1992; World Bank 2009; Gulyani 
and Talukdar 2012). As a result, income may suffer, thereby constraining the 
amount of resources available for public and private investment. Similarly, 
unregulated settlements may undermine institutional quality—an issue that is 
explored in section 5 below. Ultimately, better data is required to adequately 
address these endogeneity concerns. 
    The second limitation of this model is that it does not explain why 
contemporary variations in demographic, economic and institutional conditions 
exist in the first place—i.e. why the process of modernization has become 
disjointed. A genuinely causal explanation must be framed in terms of historical 
(as opposed to probabilistic) causation, recognizing the fact that the 
contemporary correlates of slum incidence are products of historical and 
political processes. 
 
3.5 Comparative urban development in historical perspective 
In recent years there has been a profusion of comparative empirical research 
illustrating the long-run developmental consequences of specific historical 
events, episodes and processes—or ‘critical junctures’ in the political science 
lexicon (Pierson 2000). The impact of European colonialism has received 
particular attention thanks to the pioneering work of scholars such as 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), 
who have demonstrated the path dependent nature of colonial economic 
institutions. More recent research by Huillery (2009) has provided 
complimentary evidence that colonial era patterns of investment in public 
goods in West Africa map on to contemporary health and education outcomes 
and access to basic services.   
    European colonisation was also clearly a critical juncture in the history of 
urban development in sub-Saharan Africa. In the pre-colonial era urban 
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settlements were small and scarce. In the 19th and early 20th centuries European 
colonizers introduced technologies and institutions into Africa that led to 
improvements in mortality rates and food security, which in turn stimulated 
rapid urban population growth in the region (Iliffe 2007; Fox 2012). However, 
colonial patterns of investment and institutional development did not establish 
a strong foundation for urban development. 
    Generally speaking, colonial towns and cities were built to facilitate an 
extractive economic strategy. Transport infrastructure was designed to 
“evacuate exports” of primary commodities rather than cultivate internal 
exchange (Hopkins 1973, 198), and the development of manufacturing and 
industrial capacity was actively discouraged (Bairoch 1988; Stren and Halfani 
2001). Settlements were designed to accommodate a relatively static population, 
not a growing one; for example, Zambia’s capital city of Lusaka, which is 
currently home to over 1.7 million people, was only designed to accommodate 
125,000 people (Home 1997). Racial segregation was a ubiquitous aspect of 
colonial urban form, implemented to both insulate Europeans from disease and 
enforce social control, and African areas received minimal investment as 
Africans were largely deemed temporary sojourners in town and discouraged 
from settling permanently (King 1990; Home 1997; Njoh 2004).  Despite a brief 
modernization drive in the late colonial period motivated by a combination of 
shifting economic priorities and moral sensibilities in colonial metropoles, as 
well as more immediate concerns about labour productivity and the spectre of 
urban social unrest (Stren and Halfani 2001; Cooper 2002), the legacy of colonial 
underinvestment left African cities physically and economically ill-prepared to 
absorb the influx of migrants that occurred in the early independence period 
(Fox 2012).  
    Arguably more important was the institutional legacy of colonial urban 
governance. Colonial administrative structures were weak and highly 
centralized, and municipal authorities were granted very limited authority over 
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development and regulation (Stren 1989; Home 1997; Njoh 2004). Crucially, 
control over land administration was generally concentrated in the hands of a 
colonial governor with discretionary powers over the allocation of land. In a 
context of rapid population expansion, such structures have proven 
cumbersome and have contributed to the proliferation of unplanned 
settlements.  
    For example, in Tanzania the 1923 Land Ordinance placed all land in the 
territory under the control of the colonial Governor, who could grant 
occupancy rights and recognize (vaguely defined) ‘customary rights’ (Shivji 
1998). After independence, the ordinance essentially remained intact with all 
land in the territory vested in the office of the presidency. In the city of Dar es 
Salaam this highly centralized, discretionary system of land allocation resulted 
in a gross mismatch between the demand for plots and the ability of the 
government to allocate them. A study in 1972 found that acquiring an 
occupancy permit for a plot in the city could take up to 280 days; a similar 
study in 1977 found a waiting time of 300 days (Stren 1982). Between 1990 and 
2001 authorities in Dar es Salaam received 243,473 applications for planned 
plots yet only 8,209 were allocated (Kironde 2006). Given the difficulties in 
accessing land through formal channels, most people continue to acquire land 
in the city through ‘neo-customary’ (i.e. informal market) arrangements. 
    This stylized narrative of colonial patterns of investment and institutional 
development glosses over significant variation in colonial experiences across 
Africa. However, this variation facilitates an empirical analysis of the enduring 
legacies of colonialism on contemporary urban conditions in the region. 
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Figure 3.2 Colonial era capital investment and slum incidence in 2005
 
 
Figure 3.2 plots the relationship between the sum of capital investment per 
capita in colonial African territories between 1870 and 1936 and slum incidence 
in these territories in 2005 (see Appendix A for details). The figure shows a clear 
difference between the settler colonies of Southern Africa (contemporary 
Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe), which received relatively high levels of 
investment due to extensive commercial and political interests in these 
territories, and those in other regions, which received considerably less 
investment. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that colonial era 
patterns of investment have had long-term consequences for urban 
development in the region. 
    Colonial investment patterns were also closely associated with strategies of 
rule and institutional development (Home 1990). In the case of the British 
empire, he observes that “rapidly growing ports of the Empire, usually 
acquired and governed under direct rule, created severe problems of housing 
and traffic movement which the colonial administration was reluctantly forced 
to address” (ibid 25). In these colonies, more sophisticated municipal structures 
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were developed alongside more robust legal institutions, including those 
governing the allocation of land (Home 1990; Home 1997). By contrast, in 
colonies governed under indirect rule (including all African colonies to varying 
degrees) urban settlements were managed with ad hoc institutions, including 
vague land legislation (ibid). There were, however, varying degrees of indirect 
rule in Africa, from the paradigmatic case of Nigeria to the more tightly 
governed settler colonies in Southern Africa. The impact of this variation can be 
demonstrated empirically by employing a quantitative indicator of ‘British 
indirect rule’ developed by Lange (2004). The index is a measure of the 
percentage of court cases adjudicated by indigenous (as opposed to colonial) 
authorities in 1955. As such, it captures the degree to which British authorities 
delegated authority to local powerbrokers, including authority over land 
allocation, in their efforts to maintain political order (ibid). 
     Figure 3.3 plots slum incidence in 2005 against this ‘indirect rule’ index. 
Although only 12 observations are available due to data restrictions, the trend is 
clear: legal fragmentation in the colonial era is closely and positively correlated 
with contemporary slum incidence. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
institutional arrangements established in the colonial era have influenced 
postcolonial patterns of urban development in the region.  
    It is impossible from such an analysis to tease out the nuanced mechanisms of 
causation given the interdependency of investment and institutions. As Home 
(1990) notes, institutional development in the colonies was often driven by 
interests associated with previous investments, and investment was shaped by 
the incentives created by institutions. Nevertheless, it is clear that contemporary 
variation in conditions in African cities is correlated with colonial era patterns 
of investment and institutional development, which is consistent with the 
arguments outlined here. 
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Figure 3.3 Colonial strategies of rule and slum incidence in 2005 
 
 
3.6 The political economy of the ‘political will deficit’ 
Locating the origins of contemporary variation in slum incidence in Africa’s 
colonial past takes us a step closer to a more convincing causal explanation for 
the scale and diversity of the phenomenon in the region. However, it remains 
an incomplete explanation. Independent African governments have had 
anywhere between 30 and 60 years to redress the failures of their colonial 
forebears. Understanding why they have not done so is critical to explaining 
urban underdevelopment in the region.  
    While the decisions and actions of private individuals clearly shape urban 
landscapes, governments play a pivotal role in shaping urban development 
trajectories. Even the World Bank, which has been the primary champion of 
market-based solutions to urban development in recent decades, concedes that 
ameliorating slum conditions not only “requires the institutions to manage land 
markets” but also “investments in infrastructure, and well-timed and well-
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executed interventions” (World Bank 2009, 49). In Africa, the scale of the slum 
phenomenon is first and foremost a reflection of persistent failure on the part of 
governments in the region to plan, invest and proactively manage urban 
development in a context of rapid population growth. This requires explanation 
beyond the often heard lament that there is a “lack of genuine political will to 
address the issue in a fundamentally structured, sustainable and large-scale 
manner” (UN-Habitat 2003, 5).  
    To some extent inaction may be due to the inherent challenges of overcoming 
a complex set of impediments to public and private investment—i.e. a 
coordination failure. As Collier and Venables (2013) argue, kick-starting mass 
housing investment in the region requires addressing costly inputs, 
strengthening property rights, promoting financial market deepening, building 
complimentary infrastructure and providing sustainable employment 
opportunities. Solving all of these impediments to investment requires 
harmonised action across a wide range of actors and agencies on a large scale. 
This is inherently challenging. However, I argue that there are also some 
complex political economy obstacles that have undermined political will for 
reform. 
    To facilitate an analysis of this ‘political will deficit’ I begin with a simple 
stylized model of urban development in which the interests and ideas of 
political agents inform decisions about planning, investment and regulation; 
these decisions in turn shape conditions in urban areas. The model also posits a 
feedback between conditions in urban areas and the interests and ideas that 
shape the behaviour or political agents. Figure 3.4 illustrates this simple model. 
I use this model as a guide for identifying mechanisms of path dependency—
i.e. the reasons why colonial patterns of investment and institutional 
development have persisted in the postcolonial era. Drawing on qualitative 
evidence, I first interrogate how the interests of political agents in African cities 
affect their actions with regard to urban governance. I then turn my attention to 
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the way in which ideas about development in the postcolonial era have 
informed urban policy in the region.   
 
Figure 3.4 The political economy of urban development: a stylized model 
 
 
Patronage, rent-seeking and status quo interests 
As noted above, interest in urban development during the colonial era was 
directly linked to the political and economic objectives of colonial governments 
and their domestic agents. Colonial institutions of urban governance, including 
tenancy rights and building codes, were explicitly designed to restrict access to 
urban space. While the racial dimensions of these exclusive institutions were 
generally dismantled in the independence era, the underlying structures of 
exclusion (such as land registration procedures, building codes and density 
requirements) remained largely unchanged. A common explanation for this is 
that post-colonial leaders found themselves in a position to exploit the existing 
rules to their advantage (Mabogunje 1990). In the case of Tanzania, for example, 
Stren (1982) notes that “those who have connections, education, and wealth in 
Tanzania have almost certainly been able to take advantage of…the plot 
allocation system and various other state-supported institutions in the urban 
areas” (19). Where existing institutional arrangements benefit ruling elites, there 
is little incentive for them to undertake reform. However, there are more 
Planning, investment 
and regulation 
Conditions in 
urban areas 
Interests and Ideas 
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nuanced legacies of colonial rule that have generated explicit incentives to 
actually resist reform.  
    Many authors have demonstrated the problematic political legacies of 
colonial institutions, which often blurred the lines between social and political-
institutional bases of legitimate authority and served to entrench (or exacerbate 
existing) social divisions (e.g. along lines of race, class and ethnicity), resulting 
in particularly toxic postcolonial political dynamics that impede effective 
governance (see Bayart 1993; Berry 1993; Boone 1994; Mamdani 1996; Lange 
2004). In particular, the relatively weak, highly centralized political structures 
inherited from colonial regimes have created strong incentives for rulers to 
exploit discretionary powers in order to maintain social support (or control). 
This has had direct consequences for the quality of urban governance in the 
region. 
    As noted above, colonial municipal structures were generally ad hoc and 
subordinate to executive authorities. Despite widespread efforts in the 
postcolonial era to promote decentralization and bolster the capacity of 
municipal governments, much of this has been what Faguet (2012) refers to 
“insincere decentralization.” Genuine devolution has been rare due to the 
unwillingness of central governments to cede authority over key functions 
(such as taxation, planning and infrastructure development) to lower tiers of 
government (Stren 1989; Stren and Halfani 2001; Cohen 2001; Faguet 2013). 
Control of such functions provides a variety of useful instruments of patronage 
(such as jobs, contracts, tax breaks, subsidised loans, etc.) which can be used to 
shore up political support (Nelson 1979; see also Keefer and Vlaicu 2007 for a 
formalized treatment of the appeal of patronage in nascent democracies). The 
unwillingness of central government authorities to let go of such instruments 
and sincerely work toward building municipal capacities has undermined the 
ability of local governments to deliver on their urban development mandates. 
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    Moreover, cities are inherently problematic political spaces for leaders 
because of the proximity of the rulers to the ruled. A notable feature of 
postcolonial African politics has been the emergence of populist political parties 
in urban areas which cultivate support among the neglected urban poor; the 
city councils of many of Africa’s large urban centres are controlled by such 
opposition (Resnick 2012). As city populations grow in both absolute and 
relative terms, so too does the need to appeal to urban voters (or potential 
rioters). This can create strong incentives to interfere with even well-intentioned 
planning and regulatory efforts designed to promote public welfare.  
    For example, Goodfellow (2012) describes in detail the politics of ‘anti-
planning’ in Kampala, Uganda, where efforts on the part of the Kampala City 
Council to control land use and development have been systematically 
undermined by central government interventions when the interests of 
important allies or constituencies were threatened. The result has been a de-
legitimisation of formal rules and regulations governing urban development, 
the entrenchment of a system of patronage and the proliferation of unregulated 
commercial and residential developments in the city.  
    This kind of political wrangling between central governments and city 
governments is common in Africa. However, there are also more subtle, 
decentralized forms of patronage that emerge in poorly governed cities. 
Centralized authority and byzantine regulatory structures create opportunities 
for lower-level politicians and bureaucrats to cultivate politically instrumental 
patron-client relationships by providing tacit approval for land occupations, 
building projects or other actions by urban dwellers that violate formal rules or 
regulations. The case of Dar es Salaam provides a useful illustration of this 
dynamic. 
    Formal channels of access to land in the city have failed to keep pace with the 
growth of the city’s population. Official government estimates suggested that 
some 70% of the city population lived in informal settlements lacking basic 
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infrastructure around the turn of the millennium, and a subsequent estimate 
based on property tax data suggests that the number may be over 80% (Kironde 
2006). The growth of these settlements has not, however, occurred entirely 
outside the purview of government control. It is widely recognized that local 
“10-cell” leaders (i.e. neighbourhood representatives) from the ruling Chama 
Cha Mapinduzi party, which has led the country since independence, are 
actively involved in informal land and housing markets, “authenticating land 
transactions and signing land transfer or selling agreement forms” (Kombe 
2005, 118-119; see also Stren 1975). In other words, party officials grant rights 
and permissions informally and enforce them through party channels (e.g. by 
ensuring that a planned eviction by city authorities of ‘illegal’ squatters on 
public land is called off by central government officials). This creates public 
dependence on the party and strengthens its authority at the expense of rational 
planning and regulation executed through formal state agencies (Campbell 
2009). This is, in effect, an urban manifestation of the political strategy of using 
land allocation in a context of weak property rights to cultivate electoral 
support—a strategy that has commonly been employed in rural areas many 
countries in the region (Boone 2009).  
    The disruptive effects of patronage politics on effective urban governance in 
African cities is frequently compounded by rent-seeking behaviour on the part 
of politicians and bureaucrats. Put simply, urban underdevelopment can be 
very profitable for some. 
    In failing to address the institutional and regulatory barriers that impede 
access to urban land, governments force people into informal markets and 
create opportunities for what could be termed ‘land racketeering’, by which I 
mean the offer of protection against eviction or demolition (to illegal squatters 
or developers in violation of planning regulations) in return for money (as 
opposed to political support). Land racketeering is widespread in African cities 
and can involve bureaucrats and politicians from the lowest tiers of government 
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(e.g. police officers or local councillors) to the very highest (e.g. 
parliamentarians and members of the executive branch of government). The 
situation in Kibera, a slum in Nairobi, is a notorious case in point. 
    In 2004, the population of Kibera was estimated to be 810,000 with 92% of 
households renting their accommodation from absentee landlords (Gulyani and 
Talukdar 2008). Technically, the settlement is illegal, as it is located on 
government land. However, it is common knowledge that plots in the 
settlement are informally allocated by government officials and other local 
powerbrokers with close ties to national political figures (see Amis 1984; Syagga 
et al 2002; Gulyani and Taludkar 2008). Indeed, one survey found that 41% of 
Kibera’s landlords were government officials, 16% were politicians and 42% 
were ‘other’ absentee landlords, presumably with strong political connections 
(Syagga et al 2002). These informal landlords run a very profitable racket: in 
2004 residents of the slum paid an estimated US$31 million in rents (Gulyani 
and Taludkar 2008, 1925). Moreover, the “absence of government in service 
provision has created profitable infrastructure businesses for landlords” 
(Gulyani and Taludkar 2008, 1931) resulting in a situation whereby landlords 
“are strongly likely to prefer—and work to maintain—the status quo” (ibid, 
1932). 
    In particular, poor water provision in slums has given rise to informal 
markets in which vendors sell water from standpipes or tanker trucks at 
inflated rates to the urban poor (Gulyani, Talukdar and Kariuki 2005). For 
example, in Nairobi Collignon and Vezina (2000) found that standpipe 
operators, who receive water at subsidized rates from municipal utilities, were 
selling water at inflated prices, earning profit margins of 80-90%. And in Lagos, 
Nigeria, which suffers from acute water infrastructure deficiencies, municipal 
attempts to extend services have frequently been met by intimidation and 
outright sabotage by the informal providers who profit from the lack of water 
infrastructure in underserved areas (Gandy 2006). 
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    In sum, underinvestment and ad hoc urban governance—two patterns 
established under colonial rule—have created self-reinforcing dynamics (or 
‘positive feedback’ mechanisms) by a) directly privileging elites in terms of 
access to urban land and amenities, b) generating opportunities for political 
patronage in contested political spaces, and c) generating opportunities for rent-
seeking behaviour in contexts of public goods delivery failures. There is, in 
short, a political economy logic underpinning urban underdevelopment. There 
is, however, another significant political dynamic of note; one that relates to the 
role of discourse in shaping the ideas (as opposed to interests) of political actors. 
 
The influence of an anti-urban bias in development discourse 
The role of ideas, beliefs and values in shaping individual and collective 
behaviour is a major lacuna in political economy (North 2005), perhaps because 
it is so difficult to model (for rational choice theorists) or assumed to result 
primarily from material conditions (for more classically-oriented political 
economists). Yet their influence is difficult to ignore when adopting a historical 
perspective on the forces that have shaped urban development in less-
developed regions in the late 20th century. Urban policy trends across Africa, 
Asia and Latin America have shown remarkable parity since at least the 1970s 
despite highly variable contexts (Stren and Halfani 2001; Beall and Fox 2009), 
indicating the widespread influence of trends in development theory.  
    Historically, and throughout the 1950s and 1960s, urbanisation was largely 
viewed as a positive phenomenon; as both a consequence and contributor to 
development progress. However, by the 1960s the pace of urban population 
growth in many developing regions—particularly in Africa—had become a 
source of increasing alarm. In 1970, Hariss and Todaro published an influential 
article in which they argued that governments should shift resources away 
from urban development and put in place measures to reduce rural-urban 
migration, arguing that ‘a limited wage-subsidy [in the rural sector] or a 
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migration-restriction policy will lead to a welfare improvement’ (ibid, 137) in 
countries experiencing ‘over-urbanisation.’  
    Around the same time, Michael Lipton was developing the infamous ‘urban 
bias thesis’ outlined in his book, Why poor people stay poor: A study of urban bias in 
world development (1977). Lipton argued that governments allocated a 
disproportionate share of public resources to urban areas and used ‘price 
twists’ to favour urban dwellers at the expense of rural peasants, an idea 
developed further by Robert Bates (1981) and the World Bank (1981). Lipton 
claimed that these fiscal and macroeconomic policy distortions ‘made the 
development process needlessly slow and unfair’ (1977, 1).  
    The influence of these ideas can be found in the population policies adopted 
by African governments throughout the 1980s and 1990s. For example, Kenya’s 
Population Policy Guidelines published in 1986 states as one of its objectives, ‘To 
reduce rural-urban and rural-to-rural migration which help to create the 
unplanned settlements in marginal lands’ and encourages local councils to ‘take 
part in developing rural projects that could discourage rural-urban migration, 
the main population process by which urban population grows.’  Sierra Leone’s 
National Population Policy for Development, Progress and Welfare of 1993 states that 
‘The development of the rural economy and the improvement of living 
conditions of the rural community through extension services, self-help and 
other measures are crucial to slackening the rural exodus.’ Ghana’s National 
Population Policy of 1994 argues for the need to implement ‘measures to create 
an attractive environment in the rural areas to encourage people to stay there 
and…discourage over-concentration of both public and private developments 
in the main urban centres.’ And Tanzania’s 1992 National Population Policy aims 
‘To prepare and implement co-ordinated urban, rural and regional 
development plans for rapid development in the country and to reduce the rate 
of rural-urban migration’ and ‘To take measures to moderate the flow of rural 
migrants to urban areas through special programmes for youths in the rural 
114 
 
areas.’ The case of Tanzania is particularly revealing. In a speech given to the 
Food and Agricultural Organization in 1979, Tanzania’s charismatic president 
Julius Nyerere made direct reference to Lipton’s urban bias thesis before 
proclaiming that ‘Rural Development must be a description of the whole 
strategy of growth – the approach to development, and the prism through 
which all policies are seen, judged, and given priority’ (Nyerere 1979, 9). 
     
Table 3.4 Anti-urbanisation polices, 1976-2007 
 Percentage of countries with policies to reduce 
rural-urban migration 
 1976 1986 1996 2007 
Africa 49 48 54 78 
Asia 80 63 67 71 
Europe 58 50 27 38 
Latin America 30 68 35 68 
Oceania 0 20 0 83 
Source: United Nations (2008) 
 
These examples serve to illustrate the way in which an anti-urban shift in 
development discourse was translated into a region-wide trend towards the 
adoption of anti-urbanisation policies. As Table 3.4 demonstrates, since the 
1970s there has been a sharp increase in the number of African countries with 
policies in place to reduce rural-to-urban migration.  
    Further evidence of the emergence of an anti-urban bias in development 
policy in recent decades can be found in notable omissions from key policy 
documents and donor programs. 
    Mitlin (2004) has pointed out that the widely adopted Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers, which are a pre-requisite for countries seeking debt relief under 
the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, demonstrate very little concern 
for—and even less understanding of—urban poverty issues; Jones and 
Corbridge (2010) note that a 2005 Commission for Africa report makes first 
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mention of urban poverty on page 220. And there was a notable collapse in 
donor support for urban development initiatives from the 1980s. As Table 3.5 
illustrates, World Bank shelter lending for slum upgrading and sites-and-
services schemes in sub-Saharan Africa fell from $498 million in the period 
1972-1981 to just $81 million for the period 1992-2005. By comparison, a very 
conservative estimate of World Bank lending for agricultural investment in the 
region (i.e. excluding emergency lending and development policy lending) 
between 1991 and 2006 is $2.5 billion. The total amount invested in projects 
with an agricultural component over the period was $14.31 billion (World Bank 
2007). Today, many of the world’s leading bilateral aid agencies, including 
AusAID, DfID, GTZ and USAID do not have dedicated urban development 
programs. 
 
Table 3.5 Trends in World Bank shelter lending in sub-Saharan Africa, 1971-2005 
 1972-1981 1982-1991 1992-2005 
Total shelter lending $498 million $409 million $81 million 
Equivalent per capita $5.20 $2.74 $0.32 
Notes: Shelter lending data from Buckley and Kalarickal (2006); per capita estimates based on total 
urban population in sub-Saharan Africa at the end of each period (i.e. 1981, 1991 and 2005) drawn from 
World Bank, World Development Indicators online database, accessed September 2012.  
 
The adoption of anti-urbanisation policies and the focus on rural development 
initiatives over the past three decades has had no discernible impact on urban 
population trends in Africa (with the possible exception of South Africa under 
apartheid). This is not surprising given the flawed theories underpinning them. 
The Harris and Todaro model suffers from a range of problematic assumptions 
and omissions that render its applicability to the real world questionable. In a 
comprehensive review and critique of the model, Lall, Selod and Shalizi (2006) 
do not find its conclusion that migration restrictions will generate net social 
welfare improvements to be justified. Similarly, Lipton’s urban bias thesis has 
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been critiqued for its crude delineation between rural and urban ‘classes’, an 
inattention to the connectedness of rural and urban economies and livelihoods, 
a failure to recognize intra-urban inequalities, and an absence of convincing 
evidence—particularly in sub-Saharan Africa—of a distributional bias in public 
expenditure (see Jones and Corbridge 2010). Moreover, the actually observed 
policy biases identified by Lipton and Bates were largely dismantled in Africa 
during the structural adjustment era (Becker, Hamer and Morrison 1994), and 
recent research has noted a rapid and significant increase in urban poverty in 
the region despite some moderate gains in rural poverty reduction (Ravallion, 
Chen and Sangraula 2007). In retrospect, Lipton’s theory is probably better 
understood as an ‘elite’ bias rather than an urban bias per se. 
    However, the most perplexing aspect of anti-urbanization policies is the idea 
that improving income and welfare in rural areas will serve to discourage rural-
urban migration. While this may seem intuitive, it has no empirical foundation. 
Economic development is a dynamic process that necessarily entails rural-
urban migration. As the diversity and complexity of production in an economy 
increases, agglomeration becomes a necessity. As household incomes rise 
(including rural households), demand for goods and services produced in 
urban areas rises, thereby increasing demand for labour in urban areas and 
spurring rural-urban migration. The often deployed argument in favour of a 
rural bias in development—that because the majority of the poor live in rural 
areas it follows that more expenditure should be committed to those areas (e.g. 
Potts 2012, 1390)—is based on a static concept of development, ignoring the 
inherent dynamism of the process (Jones and Corbridge 2010). 
    Moreover, decades of empirical studies have consistently found that 
improving income, health (as measured by mortality), fertility (decline), 
infrastructure and—perhaps most powerfully—access to education in rural 
areas has the net effect of increasing rural-urban migration (e.g. Caldwell 1968; 
Byerlee 1974; Rhoda 1983; Brockerhoff and Eu 1993).  
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    In sum, a shift in the discourse of development resulted in the contraction of 
urban investment at a time of explosive urban population growth. The 
diversion of development funds to investment in rural areas has probably not 
reduced rural-urban migration and may have contributed to it. It is, of course, 
difficult to quantify the effects of the emergence of a rural bias in development 
discourse and practice, but it is reasonable to suppose that ineffective 
population policies, an associated decline in investment in urban areas at a time 
of exceptional urban population growth, and a dearth of research into urban 
issues have collectively contributed to the proliferation of slum settlements 
across sub-Saharan Africa, particularly over the past 30 years. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The emergence and persistence of slums in developing regions can superficially 
be understood as a consequence of disjointed modernization. However, a 
deeper understanding of the scale and diversity of the phenomenon requires an 
appreciation of the historical and political dynamics that have shaped urban 
development trajectories. 
    Drawing on evidence from sub-Saharan Africa, I have demonstrated that the 
colonial era represents a critical juncture in the history of urban development. 
Colonizers set Africa’s urban transition in motion, but (generally speaking) left 
in their wake a legacy of underinvestment and ad hoc urban governance 
structures. African cities were consequently ill-prepared to absorb accelerated 
urban population growth in the early independence period, resulting in the 
proliferation of unplanned, informal settlements. 
    These settlements have provided opportunities for the cultivation of 
politically instrumental patron-client networks and rent-seeking opportunities 
that generate strong incentives to maintain the status quo. Moreover, African 
governments have shown signs of internalising the anti-urbanisation bias that 
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emerged in development discourse in the 1970s, which has served to discourage 
a proactive approach to urban governance in recent decades despite the rapid 
and persistent growth of urban populations in the region. 
   History, however, is not destiny. The feedback mechanisms of patronage 
politics and rent-seeking have not necessarily created stable equilibriums in a 
context of widespread democratic reform and a persistent shift in the 
proportion of Africa’s population living in urban areas. In Tanzania, for 
example, the city of Dar es Salaam has become a stronghold for the opposition 
parties that have emerged since the introduction of competitive party politics in 
1992 with a populist, anti-corruption platform (Brennan and Burton 2007; 
Campbell 2009). And in Kibera, simmering tensions between a largely Kikuyu 
informal landlord class associated with President Mwai Kibaki and a largely 
Luo tenant class supported by populist challenger Raila Odinga erupted into 
outright violence in the wake of a disputed election in 2007 (see de Smedt 2009). 
In many ways, this echoed the (largely rural) electoral violence in 1992, which 
was similarly stoked by land conflicts rooted in a history of politically 
instrumental manipulations of property regimes (Boone 2011). A power sharing 
arrangement was agreed upon in the wake of the violence, with Raila Odinga 
incorporated as Prime Minister, and a comprehensive redevelopment plan for 
Kibera was launched in 2009.  
    I have also presented evidence that the discourse of development has a 
significant role to play in shaping the policy positions of national governments, 
as well as the resources at their disposal to tackle urban development 
challenges. A shift in the discourse, towards recognizing the positive 
contributions that cities can make to development (not simply the problems 
they create), may serve to encourage governments to take a more active 
approach to managing urbanisation in a way that maximises public welfare, 
and stimulate further research that sheds light on the complex political 
dynamics in African cities that serve to perpetuate urban underdevelopment.  
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Appendix A 
Data description and sources 
 
Variable Description Sources and Notes 
Slum incidence 
Percentage of a country’s urban population living in slum 
conditions. A slum household is defined as lacking one or 
more of the following: improved water, improved 
sanitation, sufficient living area (more than three persons 
per room), or durable housing’ (p.g. 179). Greatest 
country coverage is available for 2005. 
UN-Habitat (2008) 
Urban growth, 1990-
2005 
Author calculation of average annual rate of urban 
population growth between 1990 and 2005. 
World Bank, World 
Development 
Indicators online 
database 
(http://databank.worl
dbank.org/).  
Accessed June 2011 
Avg. GDP per capita, 
1990-2005 
Natural log of average GDP per capita between 1990 and 
2005 (constant 2000 $US) 
World Bank, World 
Development 
Indicators online 
database 
(http://databank.worl
dbank.org/).  
Accessed June 2011 
Export diversity, 
1995-2005 
Average number of products exported annually. Number 
of products is based on SITC, Revision 3 commodity 
classification at 3-digit group level. This figure includes 
only those products that are greater than 100,000 dollars 
or more than 0.3 per cent of the country’s or country 
group’s total exports or imports. The maximum number 
of products is 261. Values were log transformed to 
normalize the sample distribution. 
UNCTADstat 
database online. 
(http://www.unctad.o
rg/Templates/Page.as
p?intItemID=1584&la
ng=1) 
Accessed June 2011 
Rule of law, 1996-
2005 
Average Rule of Law RL score between 1996 and 2005. 
Values range from -2.5 to 2.5, with a higher value 
representing a better score. The RL indicator measures 
perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence. Data are derived from surveys of experts 
based in a variety of sectors, including survey institutes, 
think tanks, non-governmental organizations and 
international organizations. 
World Bank 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators database. 
(http://info.worldban
k.org/governance/wgi
/index.asp) 
Accessed June 2011 
Colonial investment, 
1870-1936 
Sum of publically listed capital invested in African 
colonial territories between 1870 and 1936, calculated in 
thousands of pounds sterling, divided by national 
population in 1950 (the earliest year for which 
comprehensive population estimates are available). It is 
unclear from Frankel’s methodology whether these 
estimates are in real or nominal terms. 
Investment estimates 
from Frankel (1969); 
population estimates 
from UN Population 
Division. 
Degree of indirect 
rule 
Percentage of legal cases adjudicated by ‘traditional’ 
authorities in British colonies, 1955 
Lange (2004) 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Slum incidence 2005 85 47.51 24.57 3.9 97.0 
Rate of urban pop. Growth, 1990-2005 85 3.40 1.49 -0.17 9.37 
Ln avg. GDP per capita, 1990-2005 83 6.68 1.17 4.74 9.13 
Ln avg. export diversity, 1996-2005 85 4.82 0.65 2.93 5.54 
Avg. rule of law score, 1996-2005 83 -0.63 0.63 -2.16 1.25 
 
 
 
Table B2 Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
 Urban 
growth 
GDP per 
capita 
Export 
diversity 
Rule of law 
SSA 
dummy 
Urban growth 1.00     
GDP per capita -0.54 1.00    
Export diversity -0.13 0.49 1.00   
Rule of law -0.34 0.50 0.33 1.00  
SSA dummy 0.43 -0.60 -0.42 -0.37 1.00 
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Chapter Four 
 
Demography, democracy, development and urban protest in sub-
Saharan Africa 
 
 
 
 
Why are some countries in sub-Saharan Africa more prone to 
outbreaks of urban protests than others? Drawing together insights 
from the contentious politics and conflict studies literatures I develop 
an empirical model of protest incidence comprised of basic 
demographic, political and economic factors that theoretically 
influence the motives and means of potential protestors and the 
political opportunity structures they face. The results of a panel data 
analysis are consistent with the core hypotheses, but several 
unexpected results emerge: urban protest incidence is negatively 
associated with a country’s level of urbanisation and degree of press 
freedom and positively correlated with income. More research is 
required to confirm these results, clarify mechanisms and account for 
broader trends in contentious collective action in the region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In recent years considerable scholarly effort has been devoted to understanding 
the causes and consequences of armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. By 
contrast, very little attention has been devoted to understanding the dynamics 
of more prosaic forms of contentious collective action such urban protest 
(Harsch 2009; Pilati 2011). Yet while episodes of armed conflict are relatively 
rare and have become increasingly so since the mid-1990s (Straus 2012), urban 
protest events—i.e. demonstrations, riots and strikes—are very common and 
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possibly on the rise. What drives people into the streets? Why are some 
countries more prone to outbreaks of urban protest than others? 
    In this chapter I develop and test a general model of protest incidence 
designed to account for variation in the frequency of urban protests across 
countries and over time. The model is informed by insights in the conflict 
studies and contentious politics literatures and incorporates demographic, 
political and economic factors that have been shown to influence the means, 
motives and opportunities for various forms of contentious collective action, 
from street protests to armed conflict.  
    I test the model using negative binomial regression analysis with a panel 
dataset that covers urban protests events reported by international wire services 
in 40 African countries between 1990 and 2011. The results indicate that protest 
incidence is positively correlated with urban population size, degree of 
democracy, institutional hybridity, institutional reform and elections, and 
negatively correlated with economic growth as hypothesised.  
    However, the analysis also yields some unexpected results. While urban 
population size is positively correlated with protest incidence, a country’s level 
of urbanisation—i.e. the proportion of the population living in urban areas—is 
negatively correlated with protest incidence. Similarly, although economic 
growth is robustly and negatively correlated with protest, income level is 
positively associated with protest incidence. I also find that the number of 
reported protest events is negatively correlated with press freedom, which runs 
contrary to the expectation that press repression may negatively bias the 
number of reported protest events. There are a variety of potential theoretical 
explanations for these results, but further research is required to identify the 
specific mechanisms at work in each case if they prove robust in future studies. 
    The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section 
describes the protest event dataset used for the statistical analysis and 
summarises trends regionally and by country. Section three reviews the 
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contentious politics and conflict studies literature and presents a generalised 
empirical model of protest incidence. Section four provides the empirical 
analysis. Section five discusses the results and directions for further research. 
Section six concludes.  
 
4.2 Urban protest: definition, measurement and trends 
A protest can broadly be defined as an expression of dissent or discontent. For 
the purposes of the present investigation a protest is defined more narrowly as 
a public demonstration, riot or strike. 
    The empirical data on urban protest events used in this chapter were derived 
from the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) produced by researchers at 
the University of North Texas and the College of William and Mary as part of 
the ‘Climate Change and African Political Stability’ initiative (see Hendrix and 
Salehyan 2012). The SCAD database, which covers all African countries with a 
population of 1 million or more over the years 1990-2011, contains information 
on a variety of event types, including demonstrations, riots, strikes, inter-
communal conflict, government violence against civilians, as well as other types 
of ‘social conflict’ events that are generally excluded from armed conflict 
databases. Data were compiled from Associated Press and Agence France Press 
wires using Lexis-Nexis. The database contains information on the date, 
magnitude and location of each event. Utilising the event type and location 
information coded in the database I created an ‘urban protest event’ (UPE) 
dataset, which consists of 2704 demonstration, riot and strike events in urban 
areas across 40 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Other event types in the 
database were filtered out.15  
                                                          
15 The UPE dataset only includes events coded in locum 1, 2 or 4 in the SCAD database (i.e. 
urban areas). The data were filtered by sublocal to avoid double counting individual events 
coded in multiple areas. Only demonstrations, riots and strikes (i.e. events coded as etype 1-6 in 
the database) are included in order to omit events that could be classifies as organized armed 
conflict. Demonstrations are defined as generally peaceful actions; riots involve intentional 
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    Figure 4.1 summarises regionals in reported protest activity. It shows that the 
annual number of reported protest events in sub-Saharan Africa increased 
steadily in the 1990s, peaked in 2001, declined to 2007, and then returned to an 
upward trend. It also shows that demonstrations are the most common form of 
protest, followed by riots and then strikes. 
 
Figure 4.1 Urban protest events in sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2011 
 
 
An important concern with data derived from media outlets is that there may 
be a systematic bias in coverage associated with press freedom and resources. 
To some extent these concerns are mitigated by the fact that a) the events 
investigated here are public, collective and occurring in urban areas and 
therefore difficult to hide, b) the sources are international news wires, which are 
                                                                                                                                                                          
physical injury or damage to property; strikes involve the partial or complete abandonment of 
workplaces by those belonging to an organization or union. Observations for Eritrea begin in 
1993 when the country became independent. Somalia has been excluded from the sample due to 
the lack of other data required for the statistical analysis presented below.  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
190
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
ev
en
ts
 
Demonstrations Riots Strikes
132 
 
less susceptible to censorship than domestic news outlets, and c) wire services 
offer greater geographical coverage and face fewer space constraints than 
newspapers, which are also used to produce event datasets of this kind 
(Salehyan et al. 2012). Indeed, comparisons of the SCAD dataset with that of 
Banks (2011), which has been the most commonly employed source of data on 
protests for quantitative studies, clearly indicates more comprehensive event 
coding in the former (Salehyan et al. 2012). 
    Nevertheless, one way of empirically addressing concerns about systematic 
bias associated with press repression is to examine the correlation between 
reported protest events and press freedom for each country using the Freedom 
House (2013) Freedom of the Press database, which is based on an annual 
survey of print, broadcast and internet freedom in 197 countries around the 
world. Values range from 0-100, with higher numbers representing lower 
degrees of freedom. To simplify the visual and statistical interpretation of the 
index the scale has been inverted here by subtracting each country’s score from 
100 so that higher values represent greater levels of press freedom (0=not free; 
100=completely free). The series begins in 1993. 
    Figures 4.2a and 4.2b plot the annual number of reported protest events and 
the annual Freedom House press freedom score for all 40 countries in the UPE 
dataset between 1990 and 2011. There is no obvious positive association 
between press freedom and the number of protest events recorded. In many 
cases the inverse appears to be true—i.e. there appears to be a negative 
correlation between press freedom and protest incidence when examined over 
time. Clear examples include Burundi, Kenya, Senegal and Zimbabwe. Indeed, 
a simple bivariate correlation between press freedom and protest incidence 
yields a negative and statistically significant correlation, suggesting that greater 
press freedom is associated with fewer (not more) reported protest events. This 
is encouraging as it suggests that under-reporting due to press repression is not 
resulting in an obvious, systematic negative bias in annual event counts. 
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Figure 4.2a Reported urban protest events and press freedom, countries A-L 
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Figure 4.2b Reported urban protest events and press freedom, countries M-Z 
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The figures also illustrate wide variation in protest activity across countries and 
over time. Some countries, such as Cote D’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe appear especially prone to 
outbreaks of urban protest; others, such as Botswana, Eritrea, Gambia Mauritius 
and Namibia experienced very few reported protest events over the same 
period.   
 
4.3 Demography, democracy, development and urban protest 
To account for this variation in reported protest activity across countries and 
over time I develop an empirical model based on insights from the ‘contentious 
politics’ and conflict studies literatures. Broadly speaking, contentious politics 
scholars use case study methods to analyse social movements, protest cycles 
and revolutions, while contemporary conflict studies involves the application of 
comparative statistical analysis to understand the causes and consequences of 
organized armed violence such as civil wars and ethnic conflict. Despite 
differences in methodology and subject matter, there is good reason to view 
these literatures as complementary as they are both concerned with forms of 
collective political action that fall outside formal, institutionalized channels of 
political engagement (such as voting, lobbying and petitioning) and they both 
seek to explain why, how and when groups mobilize to express grievances or 
make claims against other groups in society (Tarrow 1996; Tilly and Tarrow 
2007; Cunningham and Lemke 2011). In other words, armed conflict and urban 
protest can be understood as related phenomena that exist along a spectrum of 
contentious collective action involving various degrees of organisation and 
violence; hence insights from the armed conflict literature may be relevant to 
the development of a model of protests incidence.  
    The objective here is to develop a general model that helps to explain 
variation in protest incidence across countries and over time, rather than try to 
provide a definitive explanation for any specific event or protest cycle. To that 
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end I focus on observable demographic, political and economic factors that 
theoretically may affect the motives, means and opportunities for protest 
mobilisation.  
 
Demography and mobilisation 
Urbanisation has often been seen as a socially destabilising process with the 
potential to stimulate political unrest and violence (Huntington 1968; Cornelius 
1969; Hibbs 1973; Walton and Ragin 1990; Goldstone 2010), but there is 
considerable theoretical and empirical ambiguity around the precise links 
between urbanisation, unrest and violence (Blanco and Grier 2009). This is due 
in part to the fact that the word ‘urbanisation’ is understood and 
operationalised in various ways (see Chapter 1). For the purposes of clarity, I 
distinguish between the possible effects of a) urbanisation and urban growth 
rates, b) levels of urbanisation, and c) urban population size.    
    The rapid growth of urban populations in developing countries is often 
portrayed as source of social strain, providing potential motives for urban 
unrest (e.g. Goldstone 2010). However, the few published studies that have 
explicitly tested the effects that urbanisation and urban growth rates—direct 
measures of demographic strain—exert on collective mobilisation or violence 
find no evidence of a negative effect.16 In an early quantitative study, Hibbs 
(1973) found no association between rates of urbanisation and an indicator of 
collective protest in a sample of 58 countries. Walton and Ragin (1990) found 
urban population growth to be negatively but insignificantly correlated with 
protest events in a study of austerity protests in developing countries in the 
1980s. In a more recent study of political instability in Latin America, Blanco 
and Grier (2009) found that a country’s rate of urbanisation is negatively and 
significantly correlated with an index of political instability that includes 
demonstrations, riots and strikes. And Buhaug and Urdal (2013) find no 
                                                          
16 The lack of published evidence may be a consequence of unreported non-results. 
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evidence that population pressure in urban areas is associated with increased 
risk of urban ‘social disorder’ events. In a preliminary data analysis conducted 
for this paper I found that a country’s annual rate of urban population growth 
is inversely correlated with reported protest events. However, this appears to 
be a spurious correlation: an artefact of the strong positive correlations between 
rates of urbanisation and urban population growth on the one hand and GDP 
growth on the other (Fox 2012); GDP growth, in turn, is negatively and 
significantly correlated with social conflict (see below).17 In sum, there is no 
clear evidence that rapid population change exerts a direct effect on the 
probability of political unrest or violence in urban areas.18  However, measuring 
population changes may be the wrong way to assess the links between 
urbanisation and unrest. 
    Urban areas are generally seen to be conducive to social and political unrest 
for two reasons. First, population concentration creates significant and 
persistent challenges associated with the delivery of public goods and services, 
as well as economic opportunity, which can create cumulative grievances that 
stimulate periodic outbreaks of public dissent (Cornelius 1969; Walton and 
Ragin 1990; Blanco and Grier 2009; Goldstone 2010). Second, population 
concentration mitigates the perennial ‘time-distance’ costs associated with 
coordinating collective action making it easier to organise a protest, 
theoretically increasing the probability of mobilisation (Sewell 2001; see also 
Walton and Ragin 1990; Glaeser and DiPasquale 1998; Herbst 2009; Staniland 
2010). These arguments are often advanced in tandem to support the claim that 
urbanisation—i.e. an increase the proportion of a nation’s population living in 
urban areas—is conducive to social and political unrest through its effect on the 
                                                          
17 Blanco and Grier do not control for GDP growth in their model, which likely explains the 
statistically significant negative correlation found between urban population growth and 
political instability in their analysis. 
18 Similarly, Fox and Hoelscher (2012) find no evidence of a correlation between urban 
population growth rates and homicide rates in a cross-country study. 
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motives for dissent and the means for mobilisation. Based on this logic more 
urbanised countries might be expected to have higher incidence rates of protest.  
    Conversely, higher levels of urbanisation could plausibly reduce protest 
incidence for several reasons. While population concentration creates 
challenges, it also yields economies of scale in the provision of public goods 
(thereby reducing motives for protest), and facilitates government monitoring 
and strategic repression, which reduces opportunities for mobilisation (Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004; Staniland 2010). Urbanisation can also encourage social 
integration and the emergence of a unifying nationalist sentiment by bringing 
members of diverse and geographically dispersed communities into close 
physical contact (Reissman 1970). This may have the effect of attenuating inter-
communal tensions, which can fuel contentious mobilisation, through personal 
friendships, intermarriages and economic interdependence. For example, Green 
(2013) shows that urbanisation has had a statistically significant negative effect 
on ethnic diversity in Africa.  
    It is also possible that urbanisation can affect the behaviour of political elites 
in ways that render protests less likely. In particular, as the share of a nation’s 
population living in urban areas increases it is rational for political actors to 
cater to urban preferences in order to a) build a base of constituents and/or b) 
mitigate the risk of outbreaks of urban unrest, which could undermine the 
authority or legitimacy of a ruling regime. The threat of urban unrest has been a 
concern for rulers since the birth of cities, hence the frequent recourse 
throughout history to ‘bread and circuses’ to appease urban masses (Ades and 
Glaeser 1995).19 
                                                          
19A study of urban political attitudes in Africa by Harding (2010) offers some tangential support 
for this hypothesis. Using Afrobarometer data, Harding found that urbanites in Africa generally 
have a more negative view of incumbent political parties than their rural counterparts. 
However, this bias appears to be inversely correlated with the percentage of the population 
living in urban areas, suggesting that urbanisation has a positive effect on citizens’ political 
attitudes toward incumbent regimes. Harding speculates that politicians shift their platforms in 
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    Empirical evidence on the relationship between levels of urbanisation and 
protest activity is very thin. There are two studies that provide evidence of a 
positive relationship between a nation’s level of urbanisation and social unrest 
(see Walton and Ragin 1990; Glaeser and DiPasquale 1998). However, the 
estimation strategies employed in both cases are questionable and in each case 
the authors have failed to control for urban population size, creating some 
ambiguity in the interpretation of the coefficient.  
    This is important because there are very clear theoretical and empirical 
grounds for assuming a positive and significant association between urban 
population size (in absolute terms) and protest incidence. 
    In many ways, the theoretical links that have generally been drawn between 
urbanisation and protest incidence are more aptly applied to urban population 
size, rather than the ratio of a nation’s population living in urban areas. The 
challenges of providing services, amenities and opportunities in an urban area 
are more directly linked to the absolute size of the population living in that area 
than to the size of that population relative to the national population. Similarly, 
urban population size is a more accurate indicator of the number of people of 
people living in concentrated settlements where coordination costs are low than 
urbanisation as measured as a ratio. 
    Moreover, the size of a population at any geographic scale (e.g. town, city, or 
nation) directly determines the number of potential participants in any form of 
collective action. In an urban area, more people mean more potential protesters. 
Population size can also affect the probability of identification and punishment, 
with an increase in population size decreasing the probability of detection and 
hence the opportunity costs of participation.   
    Taken together, these arguments support the proposition that the size of a 
nation’s urban population exerts a significant positive effect on the probability 
                                                                                                                                                                          
favour of urban voters as these voters become increasingly (quantitatively) important 
constituencies.  
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of a protest in any given year by influencing the motives and means for protest 
mobilisation, as well as the individual costs of participation.  
    There is robust empirical support for this proposition. In both cross-national 
and subnational conflict research, population size and concentration are some 
of the strongest predictors of armed conflict onset (see Fearon and Laitin 2003; 
Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Saxton and Bensen 2006; Raleigh and Hegre 2009). 
Population size has also been shown to be correlated with various indicators of 
civic unrest and protest at the national level (Hibbs 1973; Arce and Bellinger 
2007; Collier and Rohner 2008)), at the national urban level (Hibbs 1973; Kurtz 
2004), and even at the city level (Eisinger 1973; Urdal and Hoelscher 2012).  
    In sum, there is no evidence that rates of urbanisation or urban population 
growth have a direct impact on protest incidence in any given year, theoretical 
and empirical uncertainty with regard to the influence of variation in levels of 
urbanisation, and very strong evidence that urban population size exerts a 
positive effect on the probability of protest in any given country and year. 
 
Political institutions and processes 
Political institutions and process play a pivotal role in shaping the 
opportunities and motives for contentious collective action. In countries with 
autocratic regimes, where popular participation in political affairs and open 
competition for political office are not permitted, protests are likely to be rare 
given the lack of organizations available to mobilise interest groups and the 
high opportunity costs facing potential participants (e.g. imprisonment, torture 
or death).  By contrast, the ‘political opportunity structure’ is more favourable 
to protests in democratic countries where civil society organizations are 
allowed to operate independently, political competition is permitted, and free 
speech is protected (Tilly and Tarrow 2007; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). All 
other things equal, democracies are therefore likely to be more prone to protests 
than autocracies. There is some evidence to support this proposition: in cross-
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country quantitative studies Glaeser and DiPasquale (1998) found that 
dictatorships experience fewer riots than non-dictatorships, while Collier and 
Rohner (2008) show that democracies generally have more demonstrations, 
riots and strikes than non-democracies, but that wealthier democracies have 
fewer protests than poorer ones. 
    There are, however, a diverse range of political regime types that exist in the 
space between archetypal autocracies and democracies. Nearly all countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa fall somewhere in between these extremes, and the ‘hybrid’ 
nature of these regimes can provide motivation for collective mobilisation. In 
countries with nascent democratic institutions, which are not yet perceived to 
be wholly legitimate, the mismatch between public expectations and the actual 
performance of de jure institutions may drive citizens into the street (Machado, 
Scartascini and Tomassi 2011; Pilati 2011). Consequently, countries with hybrid 
regimes are theoretically likely to experience more protests than ‘strong’ or 
stable autocracies or democracies, and the existing evidence supports this 
proposition. Cunningham and Lemke (2011) find evidence that hybrid regimes 
have a higher risk of riots than strong democracies and strong autocracies; 
Urdal and Hoelscher (2012) show a similar result with urban social disturbance 
events; and complimentary studies of demonstrations and riots in Latin 
America by Kurtz (2004) and Arce and Bellinger (2007) show that hybrid 
democracies are more prone to unrest than fully institutionalised ones. This 
inverted-U has even been demonstrated at the city level. In a study of protest 
events in American cities in 1968, Eisinger (1973) found that protest was more 
common in cities where “the political opportunity structure is characterized by 
a mix of open and closed variables” (17) in terms of perceived access to city 
councillors and executives. 
    Political opportunity structures are also shaped by process and events that 
increase the possibility and potential returns of collective mobilisation at 
particular moments in time. Elections provide important focal points for 
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political contestation and mobilisation, particularly in weakly institutionalised 
democracies where the legitimacy of electoral processes and outcomes are 
contested. Similarly, during periods of political reform, when the ‘rules of the 
game’ governing important political issues such as the architecture of authority 
and the terms of political competition are in flux, collective mobilisation can be 
used as a tactic to influence decision makers or signal public preferences.  There 
has been surprisingly little cross-country empirical research on the effects of 
such episodes on contentious collective action to date. The model presented 
here is a step towards filling this gap in the literature. 
 
Economic growth and income level 
One of the most consistent findings in the conflict studies and contentious 
politics literatures is that there is an inverse correlation between economic 
growth rates and episodes of contentious collective action, from armed 
rebellions to urban demonstrations and riots (see Glaeser and DiPasquale 1998; 
Campos and Nugent 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Kurtz 2004; Miguel, 
Satyanath and Sergenti 2004; Arce and Bellinger 2007; Blattman and Miguel 
2010; Bohlken and Sergenti 2010; Urdal and Hoelscher 2012). The explanation 
for this is intuitive: robust growth increases the opportunity costs of engaging 
in contentious activities while low or negative growth decreases opportunity 
costs, intensifies social strain and stimulates divisive political mobilization 
(Bohlken and Sergenti 2010). However, the relationship between income level 
and contentious collective action is theoretically and empirically less clear.  
    There is a longstanding view that economic development, when viewed over 
the long run, can be a socially and politically destabilising process (Huntington 
1968; Hibbs 1973; Harms and Zink 2005). In essence, this view is based on the 
notion that quantitative and qualitative shifts in economic output erode 
‘traditional’ hierarchies and values, exacerbate socioeconomic stratification and 
stimulate popular demands for the redistribution of wealth and political 
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authority (ibid). There is no empirical support for this view in the conflict 
studies literature: abundant research has consistently demonstrated that income 
level and the incidence of armed conflict are clearly negatively correlated 
(Blattman and Miguel 2010). However, in the case of urban unrest the evidence 
is less clear.    
    Theoretically, more wealthy countries might be expected to experience fewer 
protests than poorer ones given the higher opportunity costs of participation in 
contentious action associated with higher incomes. Conversely, rising income 
expands the resources available for mobilization and is generally associated 
with the emergence of a middle class, which (contrary to popular perceptions) 
is far more likely to organize and participate in protest than the urban poor 
(Huntington 1968; Nelson 1979).20  
    Given this theoretical ambiguity, it is not surprising that empirical studies 
offer conflicting evidence on the relationship between income and contentious 
collective action in urban areas. While Glaeser and DiPasquale (1998) found a 
negative and significant association between income and riots in a cross-
country analysis, Collier and Rohner (2008) find a positive a significant 
correlation between GDP per capita on the one hand and demonstrations, riots 
and strikes on the other. Other studies have generally found no statistically 
significant correlation between income and the incidence of various forms of 
contentious collective action (Walton and Ragin 1990; Bratton and van de Walle 
1997; Bohlken and Sergenti 2010; Cunningham and Lemke 2011; Urdal and 
Hoelscher 2012). 
                                                          
20 Empirical support for this argument can be found in recent studies that have assessed the 
determinants of individual propensities to engage in protest. For example, in a study of self-
reported protest participation based on Afrobarometer data from 18 African countries Pilati 
(2011) found that educational attainment, employment and membership in a trade union, 
professional association or community development association—factors associated with 
middle-class status—are all positively and significantly correlated with protest participation. In 
similar study of protest participation in Latin America, Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi 
(2011) found education, personal income and ‘civic engagement’ to be positively associated 
with protest participation. 
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    Finally, an important omission from the model developed here is an indicator 
of socioeconomic inequality, which is widely believed to exert a positive 
influence on motives for contentious collective action. However, there is simply 
not enough reliable cross-country comparative data on inequality in sub-
Saharan Africa to permit inclusion in the present analysis. 
    
In sum, the following general hypotheses can be drawn from this review of the 
theoretical and empirical literature: 
(a) The probable number of urban protests in any given country and year is 
likely to be positively associated with the size of a country’s urban 
population; 
(b) Protests are likely to be more common in countries with democratic 
political institutions—i.e. institutions that permit broad participation, 
competition for political office, and limitations on executive powers—
than those with autocratic or repressive ones; 
(c) Countries with ‘hybrid’ institutions are likely to have more protests than 
established democracies or autocracies; 
(d) Protests are more likely occur during episodes of electoral contestation 
and institutional reform; 
(e) Economic growth rates are likely to be inversely correlated with protest 
mobilization (i.e. more growth, less protests). 
 
These hypotheses form the core of the model. Indicators of urbanization and 
GDP per capita are also included as controls with no a priori hypotheses 
attached. 
    A generalised version of the model derived from these hypotheses and 
controls can be expressed with the following equation: 
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where            is the number of reported protest events in country i in year t, 
        is a vector of demographic factors,        is a vector of political factors, 
and         is a vector of economic indicators. The specific components of these 
vectors are explained in detail below. The inclusion of specific indicators in this 
model is informed both by the theoretical discussion above and availability, as 
there is generally a shortage of reliable quantitative data for students of African 
development. It is hoped that the use of indicators which are readily available 
in other regions will encourage replication of the model to test the validity of 
the findings presented here as well as provide greater nuance where more 
detailed data are available. 
 
4.4 Empirical analysis 
    4.4.1 Data and Methodology 
For the demographic vector in the model I employ three different indicators in 
various combinations, all derived from UN Population Division estimates 
(United Nations 2012). The first is the natural log of the urban population (Ln 
urban population) for each country-year. Based on previous research I expect this 
to be positively and significantly correlated with protest incidence. Second, I 
introduce level of urbanisation (Ln urbanisation (%))21. There is no a priori 
hypothesis in this case. I then test specifications with each of these indicators 
controlling for national population size (Ln national population). Finally, I test the 
preferred model in which Ln urban population and Ln urbanisation (%) are jointly 
included in the equation. This is the preferred model because the population of 
interest is the urban population of each country, not the national population, 
given that the dependent variable only captures events in urban areas. 
                                                          
21 Urbanisation is log transformed to compensate for the fact that it is censored at 0. 
146 
 
    The political vector in the model consists of four indicators. Two of these 
capture political-institutional characteristics of countries and two capture the 
influence of political processes. 
    To test the hypothesis that democratic institutions are conducive to protest 
activity I include the Polity IV Democracy score for each country-year. This is a 
composite indicator combining measures of the competitiveness of political 
participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and 
constraints on the chief executive for each country and year. The indicator takes 
values between 0 and 10, with 0 representing no democratic characteristics and 
10 representing strong democratic institutions. The scale is not necessarily 
continuous given the diverse combinations of sub-components possible in the 
middle of the index, which makes this a rather crude way of measuring degrees 
of political liberalism. Nevertheless, we should still expect to find positive 
correlation between this measure of democracy and protest incidence. 
    However, the literature also suggests non-linear (i.e. an inverted-U) shaped 
relationship between democratic institutions and protest activity, with ‘hybrid’ 
regimes most prone to contentious collective action. To test this hypothesis I 
also include a Democracy2 term to allow for this hypothesised non-liner 
relationship. If this hypothesis is correct, the coefficient on this variable should 
show a negative sign.  
    The third political variable is Regime change which takes a value of 1 if a 
country experienced a polity score change of 3-points or more in that year. 
There are at least two reasons for hypothesising a positive correlation between 
Regime change and protest: a) a positive change, indicating political 
liberalisation, expands opportunities for protest mobilization, and b) any 
change indicates that a country is in the midst of institutional transition, which 
(as noted above) provides motives for collective mobilisation. The vast majority 
of regime changes recorded in the dataset are positive. 
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    Finally, I include an Elections variable, which is the sum of all elections—
including presidential elections, parliamentary or legislative elections and 
referenda—for each country-year drawn from the African Elections Database 
(Nunley 2013). This is an explicit measure of political competition and is 
expected to be positively correlated with protest incidence given that a) 
elections provide a focal point for collective mobilisation and b) public 
perceptions of procedural malfeasance in young democracies often motivate 
public protests in the run-up to and aftermath of elections. 
    To facilitate identification, the Democracy, Democracy2 and Regime change 
variables are lagged by one year. This mitigates the potential for reverse 
causality—i.e. that protests in a given year have influenced the democracy score 
or driven a regime change in that same year. With regard to elections, the 
expected influence is contemporaneous—i.e. the holding of an election may 
create motives for protest before, during and after the event. As a result, this 
variable is not lagged, which renders clear identification of the direction of 
causality more difficult. 
    To assess the influence of economic conditions on protest incidence I include 
indicators of per capita GDP growth and GDP per capita (log transformed) for 
each country-year. Both indicators are drawn from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators database and are measured in constant 2000 US$. 
Based on the theory and previous research outlined above, the former is 
expected to be negatively correlated with protest activity. Given the ambiguity 
of previous research there is no a priori hypothesis concerning the relationship 
between income and protest activity. In order to ensure that the GDP growth 
variable is not reflecting the consequences of protest activity (e.g. reduced 
investment due to risk-averse firms) a one-year lagged value is also tested with 
the model. 
    Finally, I introduce the Press freedom score described in section 2 above in the 
full and final specification to control for the possibility that there is a systematic 
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bias in the reporting of protest events across countries, and within countries 
over time. As noted above, a simple bivariate correlation between reported 
protest events and press freedom indicates an unexpected negative correlation. 
However, there is no a priori hypothesis concerning the effect of press freedom 
in the full model.  
    The dependent variable in the analysis is the sum of demonstrations, riots 
and strikes reported for each country-year from the UPE dataset described in 
section 2. The full panel is balanced and consists of a total of 875 country-year 
observations.22  
 
    Estimation strategy 
The protest model is estimated using a negative binomial event-count 
regression equation (xtnbreg command in Stata). This approach is the most 
appropriate strategy given the skewed and highly dispersed distribution of the 
protest event data (seen Appendix B) and has become the standard estimation 
strategy for analyses of similar datasets over the past decade (see Kurtz 2004; 
Shatzman 2005; Arce and Bellinger 2007; Bohlken and Sergenti 2010; O’Hara 
and Kotze 2010; Urdal and Hoelscher 2012). The functional form of the full 
model is 
 
              
                                                          
                               
      
                                      
                                     
                         
                                                          
22 Because protest data for Eritrea begin in 1993, there are a total of 877 country-year 
observations in the dataset. However, the use of lagged independent variables, coupled with 
the fact that Namibia formally gained independence in 1990 (and hence has no observations for 
the year 1989), results in the loss of 2 country-year observations yielding a total of 875 
observations. 
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All specifications include country fixed-effects to control for time-invariant 
factors that may affect the incidence of protest (e.g. ethnic diversity, former 
colonial occupier, etc.) as well as dummy variables for each year (with 1990 as 
the reference year) to control for time-variant factors such as technological 
change (e.g. the increasing availability of mobile phones, which might facilitate 
protest coordination) or demonstration effects (e.g. media coverage in a given 
year of protests in other countries, which may stimulate domestic copy-cat 
movements). Random effects estimates, not reported here, produced nearly 
identical results. Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix are provided in 
Appendix C.  
 
    4.4.2 Negative binomial regression results 
Table 4.1 presents the results of the empirical analysis. 
    With regard to demographic factors, there is a strong correlation between 
urban population size and protest incidence: the coefficient on Ln urban 
population is positive and significant at the 1% level in specifications 1, 5 and 6. 
The Ln national population variable is also positive and highly significant, which 
is expected given that these two variables are very highly correlated (see Table 
C2). In column 3, where both Ln urban population and Ln national population are 
included, the sign on the urban population variable becomes negative. This is 
because jointly including these variables in an equation is the equivalent of 
testing the association between urbanisation (i.e. the urban population as a 
proportion of the total population) and protest. This is demonstrated in column 
4, where the coefficient on Ln urbanisation (%) is shown to be identical to the 
coefficient on Ln urban population in column 3 despite the fact that these two 
variables are not particularly closely correlated (see Table C2). 
    Unexpectedly, the coefficient on the Ln urbanisation (%) variable is 
consistently negative and statistically significant in all specifications in which it 
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is included, indicating that more urbanised countries experience fewer urban 
protests on average than less urbanised countries, all other things equal. This 
finding is empirically unprecedented and runs counter to conventional wisdom. 
    All of the political indicators in the model support the a priori hypotheses 
outlined above. Democracy is positively correlated with protests at the 1% level 
and Democracy2 is negatively correlated with protests at the 1% level across all 
specifications. There are also strong positive correlations between Regime change 
and Elections and protests, suggesting that shifting political institutions and 
episodes of political contestation increase protest activity. The direction of 
causality is clear in the case of Regime change given that the variable is lagged by 
one year. However, with Elections a case for reverse causality could be made: 
protests may result in the calling of elections rather than elections stimulating 
protest mobilization. In results not reported here, a lagged Elections variable 
was generally found to be negatively correlated with the number of protest 
events in the following year. A more nuanced temporal analysis is clearly 
required to tease out specific causal patterns given the likely positive feedback 
between popular protests, political events and political reforms (see below).  
    As expected GDP growth is consistently negatively correlated protest 
frequency, lending further support to the findings of previous studies that have 
shown that slow (or negative) growth increases protest activity while robust 
growth serves to reduce the probability of urban unrest. The direction of 
causality could be challenged: protest activity may discourage investment and 
hence depress growth (Alesina and Perotti 1996), although empirical support 
for this argument is ambiguous (see Campos and Nugent 2002). To deal with 
the possibility of reverse causality all equations were estimated with GDP 
growth lagged by one year with similar results, as demonstrated in column 5.    
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Table 4.1 Determinants of urban protest: negative binomial regression results 
 
 Dependent variable = Urban protest events 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ln urban population .288*** 
(.086) 
 
-.488* 
(.259) 
 
.395*** 
(.091) 
.376*** 
(.089) 
2.86** 
(.120) 
Ln urbanisation (%) 
 
-.591** 
(.285) 
 
-.488* 
(.259) 
-.882*** 
(.270) 
-.869*** 
(.267) 
-1.09*** 
(.356) 
Ln national population 
  
.882*** 
(.270) 
.395*** 
(.091) 
   
 
       
Democracyt-1 .173*** 
(.049) 
.160*** 
(.052) 
.180*** 
(.049) 
.180*** 
(.049) 
.180*** 
(.049) 
.171*** 
(.050) 
.210*** 
(.055) 
Democracy2t-1  -.023*** 
(.006) 
-.022*** 
(.006) 
-.025*** 
(.006) 
-.025*** 
(.006) 
-.025*** 
(.006) 
-.024*** 
(.006) 
-.026*** 
(.007) 
Regime change t-1 .284*** 
(.087) 
.307*** 
(.087) 
.297*** 
(.087) 
.297*** 
(.087) 
.297*** 
(.087) 
.275*** 
(.088) 
.329*** 
(.088) 
Elections .161*** 
(.041) 
.149*** 
(.042) 
.156*** 
(.041) 
.156*** 
(.041) 
.156*** 
(.041) 
.156*** 
(.041) 
.121*** 
(.042) 
Press freedom 
      
-.016*** 
(.004) 
 
       
GDP growth -.023*** 
(.006) 
-.024*** 
(.006) 
-.025*** 
(.006) 
-.025*** 
(.006) 
-.025*** 
(.006) 
 
-.021** 
(.006) 
GDP growth t-1 
     
-.014** 
(.006) 
 
Ln GDP per capita .318*** 
(.121) 
.601*** 
(.153) 
.526*** 
(.133) 
.526*** 
(.133) 
.526*** 
(.133) 
.510*** 
(.131) 
.837*** 
(.181) 
 
       
Constant 
-6.36*** 
(1.31) 
-1.82** 
(.930) 
-10.35*** 
(1.74) 
-8.10*** 
(1.70) 
-6.28*** 
(1.35) 
-5.96*** 
(1.32) 
-3.92** 
(1.88) 
Fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
Countries 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
N 875 875 875 875 875 875 759 
Log likelihood -1478.57 -1481.34 -1472.90 -1472.90 -1472.90 -1477.74 -1265.06 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels are 
indicated by ***, **, * respectively. 
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    Somewhat surprisingly GDP per capita is positively and significantly 
correlated with protest incidence at the 1% level across all specifications. While 
this result is consistent with the findings of Collier and Rohner (2008), it stands 
in contrast to the findings of many other studies of the determinants of 
contentious collective action, from riots to armed conflict. 23 
    Finally, column 7 shows that these results remain robust to the inclusion of 
Press freedom as a control, and that the coefficient on this variable is negative 
and significant at the 1% level.24 This is an intriguing result in that it runs 
counter to the expectation that press repression would lower the number of 
reported protests.  
 
4.5 Discussion 
Overall, these results support the core hypotheses informing the protest 
incidence model. However, they also yield some unexpected results which raise 
a variety of interesting questions that could be addressed in future research. 
    The strong negative and significant correlation found between a country’s 
level of urbanisation and protest incidence is unexpected given previous 
research and the ambiguous theoretical linkages between these two variables. If 
future studies confirm this result further research is necessary to clarify the 
mechanisms at work. Are more urbanised populations easier to oppress? Are 
they easier to appease? Are they more likely to get what they want by 
influencing the decisions of political leaders seeking public support? Are they 
less likely to suffer divisive social antagonisms due to social integration in 
                                                          
23 Collier and Rohner (2008) found significant interaction effects between income and 
democracy in their study using a dummy variable for democracy. Similar specifications were 
explored in results not reported here, but no significant interaction effects were identified. 
24 All specifications shown in the table were run with press freedom included and the results 
were essentially identical. It is omitted here simply to maximise the size and consistency of the 
sample. 
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urban areas? Or is this finding and artefact of the sample, which only includes 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa? If so, why? Further research might address 
these questions. 
    Similarly, the strong positive association between GDP per capita and protest 
incidence, while not entirely unprecedented, is when situated within the 
broader corpus of empirical research on contentious collective action. If the 
correlation proves robust, more fine-grained research could explore the specific 
mechanisms at play. There is some evidence that rising income in sub-Saharan 
Africa has recently been accompanied the expansion of the middle classes in 
both absolute and relative terms (Ravallion 2010). Are these the agitators and 
participants? Do increases in disposable income increase protest by enhancing 
the means for mobilisation? Or do rising incomes affect motives by shifting 
public preferences away from basic needs and toward ideational goods such as 
having a chance to participate in public affairs and hold leaders accountable for 
their actions (see Collier and Rohner 2008 and Inglehart 1997)?  
    The finding that press freedom is inversely correlated with protest incidence 
is intriguing. It could be interpreted as providing evidence that press repression 
has not significantly biased the reporting of events in this dataset, and 
including it as a control certainly reduces the risk of obtaining biased estimates. 
However, it is still theoretically possible that there is a systematic negative bias 
in the number of events reported where press freedom is limited, but that this 
effect is being statistically overshadowed by some positive effect. Either way, 
the implication is that press freedom—or some other factor highly correlated 
with press freedom—may have a causal role to play in determining protest 
incidence.  Does a free press effectively channel dissent and conflict into public 
debate in print and on the airwaves, thereby reducing motives for collective 
public action? Conversely, does press repression motivate protest mobilisation? 
Further research, possibly exploring specific episodes of press liberalisation or 
repression, might provide valuable insights. 
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   The use of lagged values of the political indicators in the model (apart from 
elections) reduces the likelihood of obtaining biased estimates due to reverse 
causality, but there is a strong historic case to be made that protests influence 
levels of democracy, the frequency of elections and the likelihood of significant 
political reforms being implemented. The empirical model presented here only 
examines one side of what is surely a dynamic process with positive feedback 
in which protests stimulate reforms which facilitate protest, etc. (Tilly and 
Tarrow 2007; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). 
    Among scholars of African politics, the region-wide trend toward the 
adoption of increasingly liberal political institutions since the end of the Cold 
War is often traced back to the periodic mass urban protests that began in the 
late 1980s in response to economic crisis and public discontent with the 
prevailing political status quo (Wiseman 1996; Bratton and van de Walle 1997). 
In a particularly influential study, and one of the few to provide a quantitative, 
comparative empirical analysis of the links between protest and political 
liberalization in Africa, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) showed that protest 
activity was positively and significantly correlated with political liberalization 
between 1985 and 1994. However, in subsequent analyses by Lindberg (2002; 
2009) this correlation was shown to be temporally specific: after 1994 protest 
activity does not appear to have had a significant influence on the subsequent 
degree of liberalization in countries in the region. More research is clearly 
needed to unpack the temporal dynamics between protest and political 
liberalisation in sub-Saharan Africa. 
     Finally, the results presented here raise the intriguing possibility that there is 
an indirect link between armed conflict and urban protest trends in the region.  
    As noted in the introduction, the frequency and intensity of armed conflicts 
in sub-Saharan Africa has been in decline since the mid-1990s. This trend, 
which has yet to be adequately explained, is illustrated in Figure 4.3, which 
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plots trends in protests, armed conflicts, income and democracy for the same 
sample of 40 countries used in the forgoing analysis.25  
    Some authors have cited political liberalisation and improved economic 
prospects as potential (partial) explanations (Straus 2012; August 2013).  Cross-
country statistical analyses have, on balance, provided ambiguous conclusions 
concerning the broad linkages between democratisation and the likelihood of 
armed conflict (see  Reynal-Querol 2005;  Gleditsch, Hegre and Strand 2009; 
Blattman and Miguel 2010). Yet, as the figure shows, when viewed at the 
regional level and over time, it is clear that political liberalisation in sub-
Saharan Africa has coincided with a declining number of active armed conflicts. 
Moreover, there is a broad consensus in the literature that higher incomes and 
robust growth reduce the probability of armed conflict, and improved economic 
performance in the region since the late 1990s clearly corresponds to a sharp 
decline in the number of active armed conflicts. The figure also shows that 
protest incidence and political liberalisation have generally moved in the same 
direction (as predicted by the model presented above), apart from a brief 
divergence between 2002 and 2007, which coincided with the region’s best 
growth performance in decades. 
    While we cannot draw any causal inference from these basic trends, it is 
nevertheless worth investigating the possibility that demographic, political and 
economic trends may be contributing to a shift in the nature of contentious 
politics in the region by rendering armed conflict less likely and urban protests 
more likely.   
                                                          
25 Protest data are from the UPE dataset. Armed conflict data are derived from Major Episodes 
of Political Violence (MEPV) database produced by the Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall 
2013), which records all episodes of “systematic and sustained use of lethal violence by 
organized groups that result in at least 500 directly-related deaths over the course of the 
episode” (MEPV Codebook). In the figure the black line represents the annual sum of conflicts 
coded in binary for each country-year (0= no armed conflict in that country-year; 1=one or more 
armed conflicts of any magnitude in that country-year). Democracy per capita was calculated 
by summing the products of each country’s democracy score and population and then dividing 
this sum by the total regional population. GDP per capita is also population weighted. All series 
have been converted to index numbers with the year 2000 serving as the base year (2000=100). 
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Figure 4.3 Democracy, income, protest and armed conflicts in SSA, 1990-2011 
 
    
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The protest incidence model presented and tested in this chapter indicates that 
the likely number of protests in any given country and year is influenced by 
urban population size, the nature of political institutions and processes, and 
economic performance. Unexpectedly, I find income level to exert a positive 
effect on protest incidence while a country’s level of urbanisation and degree of 
press freedom both appear to be inversely correlated with protest incidence.  
    These results make a modest contribution towards filling a gap in the cross-
country empirical literature concerned with identifying the underlying causes 
and effects of contentious collective action in the region. They also raise many 
questions and point to further directions for research. In particular, the specific 
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mechanisms linking explanatory factors to protest incidence need to be 
disaggregated and fleshed out, and feedback effects need to be identified in 
order to develop a truly dynamic model. 
    Finally, the results hint at the possibility that apparently diverging trends in 
urban protest and armed conflict may be indirectly connected. Urban 
population growth, political liberalisation and rising incomes are increasing the 
means, motives and opportunities for street protests in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Given the findings of previous research, it is possible that these same trends are 
reducing the risk of armed conflict in the region. In other words, demographic, 
political and economic macro-trends may be driving a transformation in the 
nature of contentious politics in the region. If so, the recent uptick in urban 
protest activity could be interpreted as good news for Africa. 
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Appendix A  
Urban protest events: descriptive statistics by country 
Country Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Total 
Angola 22 1.27 1.45 0 6 28 
Benin 22 1.05 1.68 0 6 23 
Botswana 22 0.36 0.66 0 2 8 
Burkina Faso 22 1.86 1.83 0 6 41 
Burundi 22 3.18 2.94 0 10 70 
Cameroon 22 2.14 2.19 0 10 47 
Central African Republic 22 3.36 3.39 0 12 74 
Chad 22 1.09 1.38 0 5 24 
Cote d'Ivoire 22 7.55 5.76 1 21 166 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 22 6.32 5.52 0 24 139 
Eritrea 19 0.32 0.58 0 2 6 
Ethiopia 22 1.45 1.44 0 6 32 
Gabon 22 1.64 1.62 0 5 36 
Gambia 22 0.23 0.53 0 2 5 
Ghana 22 1.82 2.17 0 9 40 
Guinea 22 1.64 2.56 0 10 36 
Guinea-Bissau 22 1.14 1.81 0 6 25 
Kenya 22 5.59 3.81 0 16 123 
Lesotho 22 1.18 2.04 0 8 26 
Liberia 22 2.50 2.84 0 10 55 
Madagascar 22 2.23 3.84 0 14 49 
Malawi 22 3.09 2.41 0 9 68 
Mali 22 0.95 1.05 0 4 21 
Mauritania 22 2.82 2.99 0 9 62 
Mauritius 22 0.14 0.35 0 1 3 
Mozambique 22 1.23 1.15 0 4 27 
Namibia 22 0.45 0.67 0 2 10 
Niger 22 4.95 3.75 1 13 109 
Nigeria 22 19.95 13.69 0 44 439 
Republic of Congo 22 1.09 1.77 0 7 24 
Rwanda 22 1.18 1.37 0 4 26 
Senegal 22 2.45 2.58 0 8 54 
Sierra Leone 22 2.77 2.29 0 10 61 
South Africa 22 13.41 4.95 5 23 295 
Swaziland 22 1.64 2.04 0 7 36 
Tanzania 22 2.14 2.05 0 8 47 
Togo 22 2.95 2.54 0 9 65 
Uganda 22 1.95 2.68 0 12 43 
Zambia 22 3.36 2.06 0 8 74 
Zimbabwe 22 8.50 5.90 1 20 187 
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Appendix B 
Frequency distribution of reported urban protest events by country-year 
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Appendix C  
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
 
Table C1 Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ln urban population 880 14.67 1.21 12.19 18.21 
Ln urbanisation (%) 880 3.40 0.50 1.69 4.46 
Ln national population 880 15.87 1.21 13.67 18.91 
Democracyt-1 875 2.90 3.24 0.00 10.00 
Democracyt-1 squared 875 18.91 26.67 0.00 100.00 
Regime change t-1 877 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Election(s) 877 0.38 0.69 0.00 3.00 
Press freedom 760 42.69 18.02 6.00 83.00 
GDP growth 877 1.03 6.87 -50.24 91.67 
GDP growth t-1 876 9.36 6.94 -50.24 91.67 
Ln GDP per capita 878 6.04 0.98 4.00 8.59 
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Table C2  
Correlation matrix for explanatory variable
 
 
Ln urban 
populatio
n 
Ln 
urbanisatio
n (%) 
Ln national 
population 
Democracyt
-1 
Democracyt
-1 squared 
Regime 
change t-1 Election(s) 
Press 
freedo
m 
GDP 
growth 
GDP 
growth t-1 
Ln GDP 
per capita 
Ln urban population 1.000 
      
 
   Ln urbanisation (%) 0.204 1.000 
     
 
   Ln national population 0.914 -0.210 1.000 
    
 
   
Democracyt-1 0.054 0.182 -0.021 1.000 
   
 
   Democracyt-1 squared -0.016 0.189 -0.094 0.962 1.000 
  
 
   
Regime change t-1 0.006 -0.041 0.023 -0.192 -0.168 1.000 
 
 
   Election(s) 0.022 -0.004 0.024 -0.042 -0.035 0.087 1.000  
   
Press freedom 0.041 0.199 -0.040 0.646 0.646 -0.199 0.032 1.000    
GDP growth 0.023 0.017 0.016 0.128 0.106 -0.084 0.021 0.137 1.000 
  GDP growth t-1 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.161 0.124 -0.208 -0.007 0.138 0.292 1.000 
 
Ln GDP per capita -0.121 0.584 -0.363 0.254 0.342 -0.214 -0.043 .371 0.074 0.092 1.000 
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